# 1NC

## Off-Case

### 1NC

#### “Private sector” means all non-governmental persons or entities, including non-profits

Senate Report 95, (Senate Report, 1995, 104-1, “UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM ACT OF 1995,” <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/senate-report/1>)

"Private sector" is defined to cover all persons or entities in the United States except for State, local or tribal governments. It includes individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, and educational and nonprofit institutions.

#### TVA: any universally applied standard, like CWS (Consumer Welfare Standard)

Phillips 18, commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (Noah J. Phillips, 11-1-2018, “Before the Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,” <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf>)

Our second topic today is the consumer welfare standard. And I think most folks even out in the public know, this is the standard that we use across the board, mergers and conduct in courts and at agencies, to judge anticompetitive conduct. It is not only a standard that we in the U.S. apply, it is a standard that is used by competition agencies around the world. It is an economically-grounded standard, and it requires that there be harm to consumers for conduct to be condemned. Mere harm to competitors is considered insufficient. So let me repeat that again. There has to be harm to consumers, not just competitors. The reason that is so, the reason harm to competitors is considered insufficient is because sometimes a less-efficient firm losing sales or market share to a cheaper, more innovative or efficient rival, can be and often is consistent with vibrant competition and with outcomes that benefit consumers. Courts and agencies have embraced this standard for decades. Today, there are two very important discussions going on about the consumer welfare standard, and they are happening simultaneously. And I think it is important that we understand that there are two conversations going on. One is a continuing discussion about how we apply the standard, regarding whether enforcement is at the appropriate level, whether it is properly targeted. This is an introspective question on some level, in which scholars, economists, practitioners, and enforcers all ask ourselves, are we bringing the right kinds of cases? Are we using the right kinds of evidence? Should we be doing more or less in certain places? The antitrust bar, the business community, and others benefit from this ongoing and active analysis. The second discussion happening now, and the one on which today’s consumer welfare standard panels will focus, is whether the standard is itself the right metric we ought to use in antitrust enforcement and in antitrust law; some argue that enforcement under the consumer welfare standard has failed because of the law, and accordingly, that we should reform the law.

#### The aff only applies to conduct in a specific segment of the private sector

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---limits and ground---the number of potential subsets is infinite---any industry, production, single company, individuals could be included, which undermines clash; only big affs have link uniqueness

#### 2---precision---has the intent to define, exclude, AND is in legislative context

### 1NC

#### The plan does not prohibit an anticompetitive practice

Sorinas et al 18 (SERGIO SORINAS-PARTNER @ Herbert Smith Freehills. JEAN MEIJER-PARTNER @ Herbert Smith Freehills. BERTRAND MONTEMBAULT-PARTNER @ Herbert Smith Freehills. “THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO’S NEW PRICING FREEDOM AND COMPETITION ACT” , *Herbert Smith Freehills* , <https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/hsfpdf/latest-thinking/the-democratic-republic-of-congo%E2%80%99s-new-pricing-freedom-and-competition-act?pdf=1#:~:text=ANTI%2DCOMPETITIVE%20PRACTICES,competitors%3B%20(b)%20enable%20businesses> , 28 August 2018, date accessed 8/27/21)

In the Competition Act, anti-competitive practices are defined as:13

* Cartels (whether through a formal agreement or concerted practice): the Act prohibits all cartels which may (a) restrict access to the market by competitors; (b) enable businesses to carve up markets amongst them or fix prices; (c) hamper production, outlets, investments or technical and technological advances; or (d) skew the outcome of a competitive bid.14 However, authorisations may be granted by the competition commission in respect of cartels which contribute to promoting economic progress, job creation and maintenance;15
* Abuse of a dominant position: under Article 32, it is prohibited for a dominant firm 16 to (a) refuse to supply goods or services; (b) sell goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases separate goods unrelated to the object of the contract; (c) impose discriminatory prices and conditions of sales; and (d) abusively terminate business relations;17
* Abuse of economic dependence is prohibited. Yet, while defining economic dependence18, the Act does not specify what behaviour amounts to an abuse in such case.

#### Business practices are for profitable transactions

MacIntosh 97 (KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH-Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1978, Pomona College; J.D. 1982, Stanford University. “LIBERTY, TRADE, AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: WHEN SHOULD DEFAULT RULES BE BASED ON BUSINESS PRACTICES?” *William and Mary Law Review*, vol. 38, no. 4, May 1997, p. 1465-1544. HeinOnline accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 8/27/21)

These new and revised articles reflect a strong trend toward choosing default rules4 that codify existing business practices.5 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 5]] 5. In this Article, the term "business practices" is used to refer to practices that emerge over time as countless market participants exercise their freedom to engage in profitable transactions. For an account of the evolution of business practices, see infra Part II. As used here, "business practices" is broader and less technical than "trade usage," which the Code narrowly defines as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205(2). [[END FOOTNOTE 5]] This is particularly true of the recent revisions to Articles 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) and 5 (Letters of Credit).

#### Violation---the plan prohibits settlements

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---Limits---business practices are infinite, anticompetitive are specific---limits are key to a manageable research burden---impact is fairness.

#### 2---Ground---links are based on business actions, settlement are procedures that happen through the courts

### 1NC

#### ECON CP

#### The United States federal government should establish national health insurance.

#### The CP is the best way to reduce healthcare costs.

Ansell, 17 - Senior Vice President for Community Health Equity, Rush University Medical Center, Associate Provost for Community Affairs, Rush University, social epidemiologist and author (David A. Ansell, “The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills,” *University of Chicago Press*, Chapters 9-10, ProQuest)

A Call for Single Payer

I speak for many of my health care colleagues across the nation when I say that the Affordable Care Act is a disappointment. In contrast, an improved and expanded Medicare for All would achieve truly universal care, affordability, equity, and effective cost control. It would put the interests of our patients— and our nation’s health— first. By replacing multiple private insurers with a single nonprofit agency like Medicare that pays all medical bills, the United States would save approximately $400 billion annually. Administrative bloat in our current private- insurance- based system would be slashed. That waste would be redirected to clinical care. Copays, coinsurance, and deductibles would be eliminated. A single streamlined system would be able to rein in costs for medications and other supplies through the system’s strong bargaining clout— clout directed to benefit health, not profits. Finally, it would create an equitable system of care that would provide equal access to rich, poor, black, and white. As a result, life expectancy gaps between rich and poor would narrow. Hospitals that serve poor communities would have access to capital investment based on need. It has been done in other countries, and it can be done in the United States. Single- payer health care stands in stark contrast to the ACA’s incremental reform. Yet it is important to remember that enactment of a single- payer system requires the defeat of deeply vested, deep- pocketed ideological opponents, health insurance conglomerates, and a thick alliance of health care constituencies along with other interest groups. The Affordable Care Act, passed by a Democratic majority and signed by a Democratic president, was a weak compromise that left the foundations of our flawed $2.9 trillion health care system intact. It will be some time before political conditions are again right to tackle an improved Medicare for All. So why, given these hurdles, do I (and many other health care providers) persist? I persist because I have watched too many patients suffer and die because they lacked health insurance or had the wrong insurance card. I persist because I have witnessed the racial and ethnic death gaps enabled by our current health insurance arrangements. I persist because simple fairness dictates that health care is a fundamental human right. I persist because of patients like Win dora and Sarai, who deserve better. For those who counter that single payer is too expensive or politically unfeasible, we persist because the American ideal of “life and liberty” cannot be achieved without an equitable and universal health care system. Winston Churchill reportedly said, “You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing . . . after they have tried everything else.”38 We have tried everything else. I look forward to being part of a single- payer health care system that values the health of individuals, families, and communities as a common good— where health care is valued as a human right. Someday.

### 1NC

#### Text: The United States federal government should increase research and developing in drug innovation, pass the PASTEUR Act, and increase global coordination on disease.

#### Innovation

#### R&D, the PASTEUR Act, AND international cooperation solve

1AC Davies 6-4 (Professor Dame Sally Davies is UK Special Envoy on Antimicrobial Resistance; Thomas Cueni is Director General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA), 6-4-2021, accessed on 6-11-2021, The Telegraph, "The silent pandemic of superbugs could be far deadlier than Covid-19 – we must fix it", https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/silent-pandemic-superbugs-could-far-deadlier-covid-19-must/)

In 2016, the United States National Security Council drew up a playbook on fighting pandemics so that the next response to an epidemic was better handled than the response to the spread of Ebola. The same year, the G7 put tackling antimicrobial resistance (AMR) on the agenda. Today, the twin global health security threats of viruses and bacteria are very real. Every corner of our health system depends on antibiotics. It’s thanks to antibiotics that illnesses such as pneumonia, meningitis and TB are now treatable. They are used for caesarean sections, routine operations such as arthroscopic knee surgery, and cancer chemotherapy. Worryingly, bacteria mutate, just as viruses do. As a result, increasingly people are dying of diseases where the existing antibiotics did not work. Since 2016, over 3.5 million people have died of a drug-resistant infection. Overuse of antibiotics and declining investment in research for new and novel drugs are the causes of this pandemic hidden in plain sight. Without urgent action, 10 million people globally could die annually as a result of AMR by 2050. The question is, how to make sure that one goes from policy papers, dire projections and simulations to action? In the case of Covid-19, against the odds and in record time, we already have a range of vaccines to protect against the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The speed of the response is thanks to decades of research on vaccine technologies. In contrast, research for new antibiotics that could stave off the worst of AMR has been stuck in the doldrums. And whilst there are exciting signs at the early end of the pipeline, this innovation is primarily happening in small companies without the infrastructure to take a promising product all the way to market. Between 2018 and 2020, four companies that had brought new antibiotics to market declared bankruptcy or put themselves up for sale, despite having survived the perilous, decade-long process of development and testing to get a new drug approved. To give a boost to the antibiotics pipeline, the AMR Action Fund has been created to develop two to four new antibiotics by 2030, thanks to close to $US 1 billion from pharmaceutical companies, topped up with support from the European Investment Bank and the Wellcome Trust. To ensure there is a healthy pipeline of antibiotics that keep up with bacteria’s natural evolution to build resistance, we need more than a fund to boost innovation. Once new antibiotics are approved, they need to be used sparingly to preserve effectiveness and slow the development of further resistance. While this makes sense for public health, it doesn’t support the level of investment needed to maintain a robust antibiotic pipeline. Despite the huge societal costs of AMR, our health care systems are not currently designed to recognise the value of new antibiotics. We need adapted market-based policy reforms, including reimbursement reform and new ‘pull’ incentives to create market conditions that enable sustainable investment in antibiotic R&D. We need industry to fully recognise the insurance value that antibiotics provide them. We need healthcare systems to pay their ‘fair share’ for innovation. And most of all, we need governments, researchers and life sciences companies to work together, to put patient needs at the forefront. Some governments have started to take decisive action to revitalise the antibiotics market. The United Kingdom NHS’s ‘Netflix’ model to value antibiotics differently and pay for them by subscription rather than per pill has been designed to empower the health service in England to keep watch over antibiotic use whilst also encouraging investment in developing the new treatments we all need. It is a positive example of what can emerge from collaborative dialogue between government, clinicians and industry. In the United States, the PASTEUR Act that is currently before Congress should create a predictable path to rewarding new antibiotics for their value to society via a subscription contract (valued at $750m to $3bn) that prepays for all US federal use of the drug. This would be a delinked pull incentive that is large enough to move the R&D needle, with powerful support for antibiotic stewardship. More generally, the global community is also moving to take action on AMR – 135 countries have finalised national action plans, but they must be fully funded and implemented. These are good actions and are pointing us in the right direction. But, if Covid-19 has taught us something, it is that global health security, as the name implies, needs to be truly global. As the G7 Health Ministers meet, it is crucial that they give AMR a last push and agree global action to strengthen research and development for new antibiotics, once and for all. Let us not fall into the trap of tunnel vision and squander the opportunity that we have been building up to over the past seven years, to fix this silent pandemic of AMR, which otherwise could have consequences far more deadly than Covid-19.

#### No chance of great-power draw-in to Latin America.

Malamud & Schenoni 20, \*Andrés, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, Portugal. Twitter: @andresmalamud Luis L., upcoming research fellow at the University of Konstanz, Germany. (9-10-2020, "Latin America Is Off the Global Stage, and That's OK", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/10/latin-america-global-stage-imperialism-geopolitics/)

But well into the 21st century, what if Latin America is so unimportant it isn’t even on the menu? Compare it with other decolonized, developing regions. Today, Africa is home to a fifth of humanity, and demographic trends suggest it might become a serious driver of global economic growth in a couple of decades. On the flipside, extreme poverty makes it a ticking bomb, with millions of people just a boat away from aging Europe. This means that, for better or worse, Africa is becoming increasingly geopolitically relevant in the eyes of the great powers.

This assessment applies even more clearly to Asia and the Middle East. Asia is the current driver of global economic growth and hosts the only challenger to American hegemony, which is winding up in quarrels with all of its neighbors. The Middle East has the largest energy reserves in the world and remains the epicenter of violent political conflict. In contrast, Latin America is declining in both economic weight and political relevance. It offers less promise and poses a smaller threat, and therefore is unlikely to be either courted or feared. Yet, you may think, it could still be eaten.

What in Latin America could still make the great powers’ mouth water? Early in the unipolar moment, the region was still relatively special to the United States thanks to the combination of energy, migration, and cocaine. Oil from Venezuela, migrants from Mexico, and drugs from Colombia were the main concerns. Today, the United States is close to self-sufficiency in both energy and drugs, and Mexico is retaining not only its own population but Central American refugees as well.

Direct intervention has long become unnecessary. Historically the United States has intervened, either overtly or covertly, to prevent extra-regional powers from meddling in the Western Hemisphere. But this is not the case with China—and is unlikely to be. In 2016, one of us published a collective study showing how Beijing filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the region without threatening U.S. strategic interests. Since then, despite heightened rhetoric about a “troika of tyranny” (of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) backed by Beijing, or perhaps because of it, China has turned inward and backed off on its economic statecraft.

## Access

### 1NC---AT: Cartels

#### No cartel impact

Daudelin, 12 - Professor @ Carleton, development and conflict (Jean, “The State And Security in Mexico” http://books.google.com/books?id=o-Tu81Bq6s4C&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=mexico+state+collapse&source=bl&ots=Yhx\_8YtFb4&sig=pa7WFUmTZL9ABazqwXvl8euUKw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=46UHVNGWOIfxgwSRlYDACg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwATgU#v=onepage&q=mexico%20state%20collapse&f=false)

A careful look at the evidence and the fact that the U.S. seems to be disengaging from what has ultimately been a limited involvement in the region's drug and organized-crime scene suggests that, from whichever angle one looks at the problem, the latter does not represent a very significant threat to U.S. security. In that context, a sizable increase in Canada's involvement can hardly be justified by the dangers the problem represents to its main ally. The prospects of narco-traffickers provoking a state collapse in Mexico are essentially nonexistent, notwithstanding alarmist declarations by some U.S. public officials.14 No reputable expert on the country has supported that view.54 Such prospects for Guatemala, Honduras, or even El Salvador are much less far-fetched, however, which is why an effort is currently being made by the World Bank, the European Union, the U.S., and Canada to bolster the region's governments\* individual and collective capacity to confront the organized-crime challenge." It is difficult to argue, however, that the emergence of a narco-state or some kind of state collapse in Central America and the Caribbean would represent a significant threat for Canada itself. These regions—Central America and Haiti in particular—have long been plagued by corruption, violence, and instability and have previously-seen long episodes of civil war without any ripple effect on Canada. Were such developments to occur, they would create, relative to North America, the situation that currently exists in the urban peripheries of large Latin American countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, whose stability and economic prospects are not significantly impacted by the anarchy and violence that prevail in small "uncontrolled territories."

#### Conflict between cartels inevitable

Kilmer et al. 10 [Beau, Codirector, RAND Drug Policy Research Center; Senior Policy Researcher, RAND; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School, et al, 2010, “Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help?,” <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf>]

We consider here the consequences of a decline in the demand for Mexican drug exports from the perspective of economic and organizational principles. There is nothing about the analysis that is specific to marijuana or to its legalization. This analysis simply assesses the effects of a loss of revenue from one of the existing streams of the DTOs resulting from some event over which they have no control, be it a change in law or in U.S. customer tastes. Our principal focus is on violence.8¶ The DTOs can be defined as consisting of the following: (1) a set of hierarchical relationships that allow higher-level members to command their subordinates to commit violent and risky actions, (2) a reputation for providing above-market earning opportunities to low-skilled workers willing to take particular kinds of risks, (3) a network of relationships with corrupt law enforcement officials, (4) a network of suppliers and customers for various drugs, and (5) ready access to capital for illegal ventures.¶ Presumably, the DTO demand for labor will decline, at least at the aggregate level. Given the lack of specialization, one would think almost all the individual DTOs will suffer some decline. One question is whether those “reductions in force” can be achieved through “natural attrition” or whether they will require “layoffs,” to use familiar industrial jargon.¶ Large-scale dismissals might carry a peculiar risk, both for the organization and for society in general. Those who are fired may try to create their own organizations, so DTO managers may have to think strategically about whom to dismiss. Also, those leaving have probably become accustomed to earning levels they cannot attain in legal trade. Since the whole industry would be affected by the downturn, other DTOs will not be hiring. Thus, the fired agents might attempt to compete with their former employers.¶ Hence, in the short run, there could be additional violence resulting from at least three sources:¶ • conflict between the current leaders and the dismissed labor¶ • within DTOs. Even after the firing of excess labor, the earnings of the leadership most likely will decline. One way the individual manager might compensate for this is to eliminate his or her superior, generating systemic internal violence from senior managers who become more suspicious in the face of the overall decline in earnings.¶ • between DTOs. The leadership of an individual DTO may try to maintain their earnings by eliminating close competitors.

#### Arms sales and US interventionism are an alt cause to cartel violence

Monzo et al 2017 (Lilia D. Monzó, associate professor of education in the College of Educational Studies at Chapman University. Peter McLaren, distinguished professor of education in the, College of Educational Studies, at Chapman University; fellow of the Royal Society of Arts and Commerce (England); and professor emeritus of urban education at the University of California, Los Angeles. Arturo Rodriguez ,associate professor in the Department of Bilingual Education at Boise State University. “Deploying Guns to Expendable Communities,” Cultural Studies, Critical Methodlogies, Volume 17, Issue 2, 201, p. 91-100. CW: mentions of sexual violence) ©B

The Border Patrol, the War on Drugs, and Hemispheric Hegemony

The backing of particular regimes by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), military training, surveillance operations, and other CIA activities throughout the world guarantee U.S. new markets and work prophylactically against social- ist alternatives (Robinson, 2008). The military industrial complex aids in this imperialist project by developing the mightiest military in the world with the most destructive arsenal. The need to condition soldiers psychologically to indiscriminately kill other human beings requires a host of ideologies and practical strategies to mark the Other as defi- cient, immoral, and expendable; to desensitize the military and its adoring public to pain, torture, and death; and to create increasingly efficient guns that can destroy in sec- onds a mass of people. Racism, an appeal to patriarchy, and other related antagonisms are used strategically to negate the humanity of the Other and enable soldiers to see them as expendable in the context of war. When the word terrorism reverberates through the mass media, White Americans cringe at the perceived threat to their way of life. Shout the word “terrorism,” and the domi- nant group acquiesce to the Patriot Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), violations of the Amendments to the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, not to mention the suspension of Posse Comitatus during the Boston bombings or any time local police forces claim exigent circumstances to apprehend a known suspect or fugitive. Under the cloak of building “democracy” across the world, the United States squashes dissent, defeats its inter- national opposition, and maintains its position as the world’s superpower. This agenda is waged primarily in the so-called developing world where poverty and unfreedoms are too evident to be ignored and uprisings are increasingly common. The racist attack on Mexican immigrants and Chicanx communities within the United States extends beyond our borders through the exploitation of Mexican workers in the maquiladora industry. Within this framing of the Mexican people, our society is duped into seeing the U.S. govern- ment and U.S. transnational corporations as benevolently providing jobs to those poor souls from the developing world who cannot sustain themselves within a global economy. The border patrol and the narco-terrorist industry pro- vide an increasingly militarized gateway that secures a mass population of desperate workers in Mexico whose only recourse is the maquila industry and also serves as an excuse and opportunity for the surveillance of Latin America against any insurgent forces that may threaten capital interests. Through torture and surveillance training, the CIA and other U.S. government agencies support the coercion of the Mexican people and militarily and sometimes financially back regimes likely to legislate favorably for U.S. capital interests. Our guns supply both sides of the war on drugs and serve to terrorize Mexican communities in Mexico, push them out, and then terrorize them again in the United States. This “service” of extracting the greatest surplus value from the Mexican worker and controlling the political arena of the entire hemisphere to secure open markets for exploitation of people and natural resources by U.S. corporations stems not from an incessant and inhuman greed but instead is a result of the monstrous logic of capitalism. Under such logic, capitalism must continue to plunge into every possi- ble venue of profitability and power to survive.

#### Cartels won’t provoke US response—they’ll de-escalate the border

**Stewart 11**, former U.S. State Department special agent, “The Buffer Between Mexican Cartels and the U.S. Government”, 8-17, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110817-buffer-between-mexican-cartels-and-us-government#axzz3D37Ei7zA>

As we have discussed in our coverage of the drug war in Mexico, Mexican cartels, including the VCF, clearly possess the capability to construct and employ large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) — truck bombs — and yet they have chosen not to. These groups are not averse to bloodshed, or even outright barbarity, when they believe it is useful. Their decision to abstain from certain activities, such as employing truck bombs or targeting a U.S. Consulate, indicates that there must be compelling strategic reasons for doing so. After all, groups in Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq have demonstrated that truck bombs are a very effective means of killing perceived enemies and of sending strong messages. Perhaps the most compelling reason for the Mexican cartels to abstain from such activities is that they do not consider them to be in their best interest. One important part of their calculation is that such activities would remove the main buffer that is currently insulating them from the full force of the U.S. government: the Mexican government. The Buffer Despite their public manifestations of machismo, the cartel leaders clearly fear and respect the strength of the world's only superpower. This is evidenced by the distinct change in cartel activities along the U.S.-Mexico border, where a certain operational downshift routinely occurs. In Mexico, the cartels have the freedom to operate far more brazenly than they can in the United States, in terms of both drug trafficking and acts of violence. Shipments of narcotics traveling through Mexico tend to be far larger than shipments moving into and through the United States. When these large shipments reach the border they are taken to stash houses on the Mexican side, where they are typically divided into smaller quantities for transport into and through the United States. As for violence, while the cartels do kill people on the U.S. side of the border, their use of violence there tends to be far more discreet; it has certainly not yet incorporated the dramatic flair that is frequently seen on the Mexican side, where bodies are often dismembered or hung from pedestrian bridges over major thoroughfares. The cartels are also careful not to assassinate high-profile public figures such as police chiefs, mayors and reporters in the United States, as they frequently do in Mexico

### 1NC---AT: Readiness

#### Readiness is irreparably destroyed---COVID, patronage, China rise.

Cooley & Nexon 20, \*Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, \*\*Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (\*Alexander, \*\*Daniel H., 6/9/20, “How Hegemony Ends”, *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends)

CONSERVING THE U.S. SYSTEM

Great-power contestation, the end of the West’s monopoly on patronage, and the emergence of movements that oppose the liberal international system have all altered the global order over which Washington has presided since the end of the Cold War. In many respects, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be further accelerating the erosion of U.S. hegemony. China has increased its influence in the World Health Organization and other global institutions in the wake of the Trump administration’s attempts to defund and scapegoat the public health body. Beijing and Moscow are portraying themselves as providers of emergency goods and medical supplies, including to European countries such as Italy, Serbia, and Spain, and even to the United States. Illiberal governments worldwide are using the pandemic as cover for restricting media freedom and cracking down on political opposition and civil society. Although the United States still enjoys military supremacy, that dimension of U.S. dominance is especially ill suited to deal with this global crisis and its ripple effects.

Even if the core of the U.S. hegemonic system—which consists mostly of long-standing Asian and European allies and rests on norms and institutions developed during the Cold War—remains robust, and even if, as many champions of the liberal order suggest will happen, the United States and the European Union can leverage their combined economic and military might to their advantage, the fact is that Washington will have to get used to an increasingly contested and complex international order. There is no easy fix for this. No amount of military spending can reverse the processes driving the unraveling of U.S. hegemony. Even if Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, knocks out Trump in the presidential election later this year, or if the Republican Party repudiates Trumpism, the disintegration will continue.

The key questions now concern how far the unraveling will spread. Will core allies decouple from the U.S. hegemonic system? How long, and to what extent, can the United States maintain financial and monetary dominance? The most favorable outcome will require a clear repudiation of Trumpism in the United States and a commitment to rebuild liberal democratic institutions in the core. At both the domestic and the international level, such efforts will necessitate alliances among center-right, center-left, and progressive political parties and networks.

What U.S. policymakers can do is plan for the world after global hegemony. If they help preserve the core of the American system, U.S. officials can ensure that the United States leads the strongest military and economic coalition in a world of multiple centers of power, rather than finding itself on the losing side of most contests over the shape of the new international order. To this end, the United States should reinvigorate the beleaguered and understaffed State Department, rebuilding and more effectively using its diplomatic resources. Smart statecraft will allow a great power to navigate a world defined by competing interests and shifting alliances.

The United States lacks both the will and the resources to consistently outbid China and other emerging powers for the allegiance of governments. It will be impossible to secure the commitment of some countries to U.S. visions of international order. Many of those governments have come to view the U.S.-led order as a threat to their autonomy, if not their survival. And some governments that still welcome a U.S.-led liberal order now contend with populist and other illiberal movements that oppose it.

Even at the peak of the unipolar moment, Washington did not always get its way. Now, for the U.S. political and economic model to retain considerable appeal, the United States has to first get its own house in order. China will face its own obstacles in producing an alternative system; Beijing may irk partners and clients with its pressure tactics and its opaque and often corrupt deals. A reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy apparatus should be able to exercise significant influence on international order even in the absence of global hegemony. But to succeed, Washington must recognize that the world no longer resembles the historically anomalous period of the 1990s and the first decade of this century. The unipolar moment has passed, and it isn’t coming back.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

#### China isn’t revisionist.

McKinney 19, \*Jared Morgan; PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); \*\*Nicholas Butts; Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader. He holds an LL.M. from Peking University, an MSc from The London School of Economics and an MPA from Harvard University where he was also a Crown Prince Frederik Scholar and a Cheng Fellow. (Winter 2019, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, pg. 75-76, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02\_Issue-4/McKinney.pdf)

In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion.

When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27

Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31

Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

#### Pursing heg locks in overstretch and a Russia-China axis.

Porter 19, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. (Patrick Porter (2019) “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590079>)

There is little sign of active “splitting” currently, however. (A notable exception is recent collaboration with Beijing over North Korea’s nuclear program, even if it is marred by tension and distrust.) Rather, the United States is encouraging the perception of a common enemy. By militarily positioning itself within striking distance of Russia and China through a semi-encircling presence in eastern Europe and north-east Asia, expanding alliances, entertaining further expansion, ramping up freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea, reviving the pursuit of an antiballistic missile shield, establishing a reputation as a sponsor of “color revolutions” and as an overthrower of regimes, Washington helps draw Beijing and Moscow closer together into a balancing coalition. A nascent Russia-China alliance is suggested by Russia’s own interagency inquiry into the possibility, the frequency of Putin-Xi contact, deliberate tightening of economic interaction, and overt displays and declarations of close military ties through joint exercises and arms sales.24

It does not have to be this way. The United States has a geopolitical advantage—its distant location. Most powers, most of the time, are more concerned by the potential threat of other nearby land powers than distant sea powers.25Based in the Western hemisphere, the United States has less of a compelling security interest in adversaries ’backyards, allowing Washington the choice of adopting a more distant pose. Russia and China, by contrast, are neighbors so cannot withdraw, both are primarily continental land-based military powers, and historically such proximity can exacerbate rivalries and mutual fears. Sino-Russian antagonism remains a built-in possibility. Only under the right conditions, though, can the rivalries again grow. This is not a plea for a trilateral realignment whereby one state agrees to be the United States’ “geopolitical hammer” and teams up with Washington to contain the other. Rather, it is to suggest that more American restraint in one theater could make space for Russia-China frictions to take effect in another.

This geopolitical principle will prove controversial. The bipartisan consensus among security experts in Washington is to assume that only a state of preponderance over all rivals will suffice. Policymakers assume that the problem lies in Washington’s failure to apply enough power, or to apply enough power efficiently enough. They then call for the allocation of more resources and their smarter use in order to sustain U.S. dominance. The congressionally-mandated2018National Defense Strategy Commission report, appointed to make recommendations, is a case in point. It takes dominance as the obvious U.S. national interest. It complains that as rivals challenge American power, U.S. military superiority and its capacity to wage concurrent wars has eroded, due tor-educed defense expenditure, and advises that it spend more while cutting entitlements.26On this logic, a defense budget that is already10 times the size of Russia’s and four times the size of China’s is not enough, for U.S. grand strategy must go beyond defense and deterrence to achieve unchallengeable strength. That the pursuit of dominance could be the source of the problem, not the answer, is not considered.

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more.

Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expend-able for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources.

To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place.

Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### Russia-China coordination triggers global war.

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While Washington takes a wait-and-see approach, Moscow and Beijing could be coordinating to significantly thwart U.S. interests over the next 15 to 25 years. The two powers may never forge a formal military alliance, but they could still work together in ways that cause major headaches for the United States. Imagine, for example, that Russia and China coordinate the timing of hostile actions on their peripheries. If China made aggressive moves in support of its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea at the same time that Russia made further incursions into Ukraine, U.S. forces would struggle to respond effectively to either gambit.

Nonmilitary collaboration between Russia and China could weaken the United States and even threaten its way of life. Both countries are likely to use their cyber and disinformation capabilities to, as the director of national intelligence put it in January, “steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” China currently does not exhibit Russia’s zeal for using such measures, particularly against the United States; but if U.S.-Chinese relations darken, Beijing could plausibly take a page from Russia’s playbook and mount coordinated, deniable cyberattacks or interference campaigns against the United States.

China and Russia behave very differently in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, but the combined effect of their actions is often greater than the sum of its parts. In Europe, for example, China has amassed economic influence through growing trade relationships and Belt and Road-related infrastructure investments not contingent on standards for democratic governance and human rights, particularly in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy. This engagement will ultimately translate into political leverage, as it already has in many countries in Asia. Russia, for its part, appears intent on pursuing hybrid tactics that disrupt democratic processes. On their own, each of these activities is already worrisome for the United States and Europe. But a scenario in which each country’s actions amplify the other’s is not hard to imagine. China, for example, could eventually use its growing ownership of European ports and rail lines to slow a NATO response to Russian aggression. Likewise, Beijing could use the economic leverage it has accrued to quietly dissuade an already reluctant NATO member state such as Hungary or Turkey from responding to Russia’s hybrid tactics, which could ultimately serve to discredit NATO’s commitment to collective defense.

## Innovation

### 1NC---AT: ABR

#### AMR is gradual, slow, and will be addressed---reject scary-sounding headlines

Smith 16, PhD molecular biologist, former R&D director at MicroPhage and SomaLogic. (Drew, 6-14-16, “The Myth Of The Post-Antibiotic Era”, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2016/06/14/the-myth-of-the-post-antibiotic-era/#db027696fa83>)

Right now, drug resistant infections are mainly a threat to those that are already sick and/or in medical facilities. But, if we continue down this path, mundane infections in the otherwise healthy could someday morph into life-threatening ordeals, and simple medical procedures and surgeries may be skipped to avoid risk of infection. However, while this threat is real, it’s important to keep in mind that this is an ongoing, gradual challenge; it’s extremely unlikely that a single event will herald with complete certainty the abrupt end of modern medicine as we know it. In this context, those scary headlines are inappropriate, if not numbing and counterproductive. In May, Ars wrote about some alarmist and inaccurate news stories dealing with a newly identified type of drug resistance—one that makes bacteria resistant to a last-resort antibiotic called colistin and can spread between bacteria easily. The headlines blared that it was the “first” time such a dastardly microbe had seeped into the US—which is not true. And they suggested that it would certainly mark the end of antibiotics—also not true. This week, scientists provided updates on tracking that type of resistance, and of course some alarmist headlines followed. Yet, the new data actually suggests that a tempering of concerns about this particular resistance may be in order. It turns out that this “dreaded,” “scary,” “nightmare” of a drug-resistant microbe has been in the US for more than a year and elsewhere in the world since as far back as 2005—it’s just that nobody noticed it. And nobody noticed it because so far it hasn’t been the dreaded, scary nightmare some have feared. “It’s not a huge cause for concern,” Mariana Castanheira, lead author of one of this week’s resistance updates, told Ars. Castanheira is the director for Molecular and Microbiology at JMI Laboratories, a private company that monitors drug resistance microbes in hospitals and medical settings. They and others are finding this new type of resistance now simply because they’re looking for it, she said. Castanheira explains that people initially started digging for this new type of drug resistance—a gene called mcr-1—out of concern that it makes bacteria resistant to the antibiotic colistin, which is a relatively toxic drug used only when nearly all others have failed against a multi-drug resistant infection. Bacteria have shown up with colistin resistance before—in fact, many times in the US and elsewhere around the world. But in those cases, the genes were embedded in the bacteria’s chromosomes and generally passed down through generations. The mcr-1 resistance gene, on the other hand, seems to always sit on a plasmid, a small loop of DNA that bacteria can readily pass around to neighbors. If colistin-resistant bacteria shared their mcr-1 plasmid with others that are already resistant to lots of antibiotics, they could create a long-feared invincible germ—a “pan-resistant” bacteria. “Doesn’t scare me” So far that doesn’t seem to be happening, though, Castanheira said. In more than a decade of skulking around, mcr-1 has made its way into bacteria in animals, people, and soil all over the world. Yet, all of the mcr-1 carrying microbes examined have been susceptible to at least one antibiotic—and often several.

### 1NC---AT: Disease

#### No extinction from disease.

Barratt 17, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute. (Owen Cotton-Barratt et al, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”, pg. 9, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>)

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

## Econ

### 1NC---AT: Econ

#### No correlation between economic decline and war.

Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Growth is unsustainable — pursuit causes extinction and turns war.

Trainer 20, PhD from University of Sydney. Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (Ted, The Simpler Way: Collected Writings of Ted Trainer, *The Simplicity Institute*, pp. 3-6)

1. Unsustainability

The way of life we have in rich countries is grossly unsustainable. There is no possibility of all people on Earth ever rising to rich world per capita levels of consumption of energy, minerals, timber, water, food, phosphorous etc. These rates of consumption are generating numer-ous alarming global problems, now threatening our survival and the survival of other species. Most people have no idea of the magnitude of the overshoot – of how far we are beyond sustainable levels of re-source use and environmental impact. If all the estimated 9.8 billion people living on earth in 2050 were to consume resources at the pres-ent per capita rate in rich countries, world annual resource production rates would have to be about eight times as great as they are now.

For instance, the ‘Ecological Footprint’ analysis indicates that the amount of productive land required to provide one person in Australia with food, water, energy and settlement area is about 6.6 ha (Global Footprint Network, 2019). If 9.8 billion people were to live as Australians do, approximately 65 billion ha of productive land would be required. However, the total amount of productive land available is only 12 billion ha. If we assume one third of this should be set aside for nature (see, e.g., Baillie Yang, 2018) the amount available for humans might be about 8 billion ha. In other words, our rich world per capita footprint is about eight times as big as it would ever be possible for all of the world’s people to sustainably share.

Figures for some other items indicate much worse ratios. For instance, the top 10 nations consuming iron ore and bauxite (from which we ob-tain aluminium and steel) have per capita use rates that are respectively around 65 and 90 times the rates for all the other nations (Wiedmann et al., 2015). Mineral ore grades are falling. All people could not rise to present rich world levels of mineral use. The same case can be made with respect to just about all other resources and ecosystem services, such as agricultural land, forests, fisheries, water and biomass.

These simple figures clearly demonstrate the impossibility of all people ever having the material ‘living standards’ we have taken for granted in rich countries like Australia. We are not just a little beyond sustainable levels of resource demand and ecological impact – we are far beyond sustainable levels. Rich world practices, systems and ‘living standards’ are grossly unsustainable, and can never be extended to all the world’s people. Again, few people seem to grasp the magnitude of the over-shoot. We must face up to dramatic reductions in our present per capita levels of production and consumption.

1.1. Now add the absurd commitment to economic growth

The main worry is not the present level of resource use and ecological impact discussed above, it is the level we will rise to given the obsession with constantly increasing the amount of production and consumption. The supreme goal in all countries is to raise incomes, ‘living standards’ and GDP as much as possible, constantly and without any idea of a limit. That is, the most important goal is economic growth.

Consider the implications. If we assume a) a 3% p.a. economic growth, b) a population of 9.8 billion, c) all the world’s people rising to the living standards we in the rich world would have in 2050 given 3% p.a. growth – in that scenario, the total volume of world economic output would be 20 times as great as it is now and doubling every 23 years thereafter.

So even though the present levels of production and consumption are grossly unsustainable, the determination to have continual increase in income and economic output will multiply these towards absurd and impossible levels in coming decades.

Why analyse in terms of 9.8 billion rising to rich world levels? Because a) it is not morally acceptable to assume that they remain much poorer than we are, and b) that’s what everyone aspires to, so we had better think about whether it is viable.

1.2 But what about technical advance?

When confronted by global sustainability problems most people just assume that technical advance and ‘green growth’ will solve them, enabling us to go on living with ever-increasing levels of affluence. They do not realise that the magnitude of the problems rules this out.

The core ‘tech-fix’ faith is that resource demand and environmental impacts can be ‘decoupled’ from economic growth, i.e., that produc-tion and consumption can go on increasing while resource demand is sufficiently reduced. This is extremely implausible (see Part Three of this anthology for more detail). How likely is it that the world’s amount of production could be multiplied by 20 while resource use and environmental impacts are reduced by, say, 50% – i.e., a factor 40 reduction? None of the thirty or more reports over the last 20 years show any global reduction at all; they all show that as GDP rises so do the impacts. The recent review essay by Hickel and Kallis (2019) pro-vides a powerful critique of ‘green growth’ (see also Ward et al., 2016).

1.3 Global problems should be seen in terms of ‘limits to growth’

The ‘limits to growth’ perspective (Meadows et al., 1972) is essential if we are to understand the most serious global problems facing us:

The environmental problem is basically due to the fact that far too much producing and consuming is going on, taking too many resources rom nature and dumping too many wastes back into nature. We are eliminating species mainly because we are taking or ruining so much habitat. The environmental problems cannot be solved in an economy that is geared to providing ever-rising production, con-sumption, ‘living standards’ and GDP (see the next essay, ‘Why this economy must be scrapped’, for more detail).

Third World poverty and underdevelopment are inevitable if a few living in rich countries insist on taking far more of the world’s re-sources than all could have. The Third World can never develop to rich world levels of consumption, because there are far too few re-sources for that. (For more detail on this issue, see the essay ‘Third World development’ in Part Two.)

Conflict and war are inevitable if all aspire to rich world rates of consumption, and if rich countries insist on limitless growth on a planet with limited resources. Rich countries now have to support repressive regimes willing to establish policies that enable our cor-porations to ship out cheap resources, use Third World land for export crops, exploit cheap labour etc. This means we must be ready to get rid of regimes and to invade and run countries that threaten to follow policies contrary to our First World interests. Our rich world living standards could not be as high as they are if a great deal of repression and violence was not taking place, and rich countries contribute significantly to this. If we are determined to remain affluent, we should remain heavily armed! (This issue is developed in the essay in part Two called ‘If you want affluence, prepare for war’.)

Social cohesion is deteriorating and quality of life is being damaged. This is so even in the richest nations, because the supreme goals are raising business turnover, incomes and the GDP, not meet-ing needs, building community and improving the quality of life. (Some details of this decline in quality of life and the benefits of an alternative way to live are discussed in Part Four.)

#### Warming causes extinction and makes economic decline and war inevitable.

Spratt et al. 20, David Spratt: Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration and co-author of What Lies Beneath: The understatement of existential climate risk and Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action. Alia Armstead: Research Coordinator for Breakthrough. Ian Dunlop: co-author of What Lies Beneath and of the Club of Rome’s Climate Emergency Plan. He is a senior member of the Breakthrough Advisory Board (How Economics Has Underestimated Climate Damage and Encouraged Inaction, *Breakthrough - National Centre for Climate Restoration*, Accessible: https://www.breakthroughonline.org.au/publications)

THREE DEGREES OF WARMING Cost–benefit analysis, the mainstay of climate change economics, requires dollar numbers to be put on the costs of acting to reduce the level of future warming as compared to the damage caused by not acting, for various emissions scenarios. The first requirement is that these numbers can be reasonably estimated. Recent work from the University of Melbourne has shown that on current global emission patterns, a conservative estimate of costs of inaction for Australia would be $A584.5 billion by 2030, $A762 billion by 2050, and more than $A5 trillion in cumulative damages from now until 2100. On the other hand, the cost of effective emissions reduction is estimated to be $A35.5 billion up to 2030, or 0.14% of cumulative GDP (Kompas et al. 2019). The estimated costs in the report and the majority of economic analyses to date focus on infrastructure damage, agricultural and labour productivity losses, human health impacts and ecosystem losses, but this is just the tip of the iceberg. The costs of extreme weather events, pollution and ecosystem and biodiversity loss are not included. More importantly, neither are the economic damages that Australia will incur as 3°C of warming sweeps through Asia and the Pacific, devastating nations, disrupting major trading partners and supply chains, and likely turning the region — the “disaster alley” of global climate disruption — into one of social chaos and breakdown (Dunlop & Spratt 2017). Thirteen years ago, senior US national security analysts looked at the consequences of 3°C of warming and concluded that it would “give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario, nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges… Armed conflict between nations over resources… is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to outright chaos” (Campbell et al. 2007). A survey of the scientific literature on the likely impacts of 3°C paints a frightening picture (Spratt and Dunlop 2019). In such a world, it is likely that the structures of societies will be severely tested, and some will crash. The poorest nations will suffer first and most deeply from climate change, but no region will escape. Water availability will decrease sharply in the lowerlatitude dry tropics and subtropics, and affect almost two billion people worldwide. Agriculture will become nonviable in the dry subtropics. The Sahara will jump the Mediterranean as Europeans begin a long trek north. Water flows into the great rivers of Asia will be reduced by the loss of more than one-half, and perhaps much more, of the Himalayan ice sheet. Aridification will emerge over more than 30% of the world’s land surface, most severely in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, rural Australia and across the southwestern United States. Most regions in the world will experience a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production will be inadequate to feed the global population and food prices will skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutritional content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, aridification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human summer habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile will be inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Kolkata, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Miami — abandoned. Deadly heat conditions will persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, Central America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation, aridification, conflicts over land and water, and rising sea levels will contribute up to a billion people being displaced. Refugee conventions may give way to walls and blockades. One of the most recent and detailed cost-benefit analyses to be published uses detailed country-specific damage calculations. It finds that losses from climate damages for the higher emission scenarios will be up to 42% of global GDP by 2100. This is ten times the figure suggested by Nordhaus in his Nobel oration. Even so, the authors acknowledge that they do not account for “possible amplifications, for example, due to a potential destabilization of societies” (Ueckerdt et al. 2019). UNDERESTIMATING DAMAGE Economic analysis of climate change has systematically underestimated the impacts of future damage, and in particular failed to account for non-linear changes in the climate system. A recent report (see page 12), describes the problem of missing risks in economic assessments of climate change impacts. Do we have a realistic measure of the economic costs from future climate damages? “In a word, no,” is the answer from Prof. Tom Kompas, who says projections for economic damages under different global warming scenarios “are difficult to come by, save for simple, highly aggregated measures drawn from basic computational models… which can often be very misleading given their extreme and implicit tendency to average effects” (Kompas 2020). This deficiency in analysis is not restricted to IAMs. It is a broader methodological problem. Stated most bluntly, in the sphere of economics, there is no robust methodology for understanding the full range of economic consequences of climate disruption. Such a methodology may not be possible because it would require a systems-level analysis of global interactions in the physical, economic and sociopolitical spheres. There are also profound challenges in understanding how physical impacts translate into economic and social consequences. Economic analysis of climate change impacts falls into two broad categories: estimates of climate-warming-related economic damage; and cost–benefit analysis of various mitigation and technological paths, using IAMs. In both cases, there are big grey areas because such work requires understanding of: • Cumulative greenhouse gas emissions for the period under consideration; • How that affects atmospheric greenhouse gas levels; • The direct physical climate consequences for temperature and precipitation patterns, the range of extreme events, and impacts on major climate system elements such as the cryosphere, sea levels, carbon stores, ocean and atmospheric circulations; • How these physical changes impact the biosphere, agricultural land and water resources, and hence the impact on human societies and their ability to fulfil their basic needs for food, water and shelter; • How this impacts social and political relationships, and hence stability at local, regional and global levels; and • How climate-induced disruptions in one human system, for example the financial system, interact and feedback on other human system elements to act as climate and economic disruption impact multipliers. There are significant uncertainties in moving through these steps. What is the climate sensitivity value — the relationship between changes in greenhouse gas levels and temperature? How do changes in the basic physical system affect agriculture, tourism, labour productivity and human health, let alone more complex issues such as where we live and social organisation? How can accounting be made for non-linear climate system changes given the basic unpredictability of such events? How do the more immediate socio-economic impacts become translated into national and human security consequences: the breakdown of society, forced migration and conflict? How can disruptions in one or several systems affect other systems? Australia’s 2019-2020 megafires are a good case study, in which impacts spread across various systems: housing, infrastructure and communications, local economies, banking services, water and food security, agriculture and tourism, as well as the losses of biodiversity and ecosystems. The problem of analysis can also be seen in the very wide range of estimates of the damage caused by the mega fires, from $A4 billion up to $A100 billion. All these difficult-to-analyse and quantify possibilities mean that, particularly at the higher end of the range of projected warming, the uncertainties are such that no credible estimates in dollar terms can be made. And it is foolish to try and reduce devastating social and human security consequences to a monetary figure. What is the value of a human life? What is the value of the lives lost in the Syrian war, where climate impacts (drought and desertification) became an accelerant to instability? There are big issues concerning the underestimation of physical impacts, and the failure to account for non-linear changes, system thresholds and mutually reinforcing processes. Risk analysis has been poor, and there is scant recognition within the academic literature that “high-end” outcomes may eventuate and produce economic damage beyond quantification. The reports of the IPCC have exhibited a preference for conservative projections and scholarly reticence (Spratt & Dunlop 2018). MISSING RISKS • Economic assessments of the potential future risks of climate change have been omitting or grossly underestimating many of the most serious consequences for lives and livelihoods because these risks are difficult to quantify precisely and lie outside of human experience. • Scientists are growing in confidence about the evidence for the largest potential impacts of climate change and the rising probability that major thresholds in the Earth’s climate system will be breached as global mean surface temperature rises, particularly if warming exceeds 2°C above the preindustrial level. • Many of these impacts will grow and occur concurrently across the world as global temperature climbs. • Some of these impacts involve thresholds in the climate system beyond which major impacts accelerate, or become irreversible and unstoppable. • When a threshold is breached, it might cause one or more other thresholds to be exceeded as well, leading to a cascade of impacts. • Many of these impacts could exceed the capacity of human populations to adapt, and would significantly affect and disrupt the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people worldwide. • These impacts would also undermine economic growth and development, exacerbate poverty and destabilise communities. • Economic assessments fail to take account of the potential for large concurrent impacts across the world that would cause mass migration, displacement and conflict, with huge loss of life. • Economic assessments that are expressed solely in terms of effects on output (e.g. gross domestic product), or that only extrapolate from past experience, or that use inappropriate discounting, do not provide a clear indication of the potential risks to lives and livelihoods. • It is likely that there are additional risks that we are not yet anticipating simply because scientists have not yet detected their possibility, as we have entered a period of climate change that is unprecedented in human history. • The lack of firm quantifications is not a reason to ignore these risks, and when the missing risks are taken into account, the case for strong and urgent action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions becomes even more compelling. From: “The missing economic risks in assessments of climate change impacts” (DeFries et al. 2019). This scientific reticence is one basis for economic reticence. Naomi Oreskes and Nicholas Stern say that since climate scientists have been underestimating the rate of climate change and the severity of its effects, “then economists will necessarily underestimate their costs” (Oreskes & Stern 2019). When the climate conditions change sufficiently for experience to no longer be a reliable guide to the future, then economic estimates become more and more uncertain. In many cases, modellers: simply omit it from the model, assessment or discussion. In economic assessments of climate change, some of the largest factors, like thresholds in the climate system, when a tiny change could tip the system catastrophically, and possible limits to the human capacity to adapt, are omitted for this reason. In effect, economists have assigned them a value of zero, when the risks are decidedly not (Oreskes & Stern 2019). The consequence of ignoring the “missing risks” is that a stark reality is overlooked: the damage caused by climate change may be infinite, beyond all equations, models and cost-benefit analysis (see Beyond quantification, page 6). An IMF Working Paper notes a growing agreement between economists and scientists “that risk of catastrophic and irreversible disaster is rising, implying potentially infinite costs of unmitigated climate change, including, in the extreme, human extinction” (Krogstrup & Oman 2019).

#### A second recession during COVID guarantees a successful transition — it both forces degrowth policies and makes them more popular.

Kallis et al. 20, ICREA Professor at the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, With: Susan Paulson, Giacomo D’Alisa, Federico Demaria (Giorgios, “The case for degrowth in a time of pandemic,” *openDemocracy*, 5/14/2020, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/case-degrowth-time-pandemic/>)

The pandemic has lain bare the fragility of existing economic systems. Wealthy nations have more than enough resources to cover public health and basic needs during a crisis, and could weather declines in non-essential parts of the economy by reallocating work and resources to essential ones. Yet the way current economic systems are organized around constant circulation, any decline in market activity threatens systemic collapse, provoking generalized unemployment and impoverishment. It doesn’t have to be this way. To be more resilient to crises – pandemic, climatic, financial, or political – we need to build systems capable of scaling back production in ways that do not cause loss of livelihood or life. We make the case for degrowth. Conservative outlets such as [Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2020/04/29/still-against-degrowth/), the [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/0b171892-8afd-11ea-9dcb-fe6871f4145a), or the [Spectator](https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-coronavirus-crisis-reveals-the-misery-of-degrowth-), have been pronouncing that the coronavirus crisis reveals “the misery of degrowth”. But what is happening during the pandemic [is not degrowth](https://twitter.com/DegrowthMemes/status/1255783275987177473). Degrowth is a project of living meaningfully, enjoying simple pleasures, commoning, sharing and relating more with others, and working less, in more equal societies. The goal of degrowth is to purposefully slow things down in order to minimize harm to humans and earth systems and to reduce exploitation. The current situation is terrible, not because carbon emissions are declining, which is good, but because many lives are lost; it is terrible not because GDPs are going down, to which we are indifferent, but because processes in place to protect livelihoods when growth falters are grossly insufficient and unjust. We would like to see societies become slower by design, not disaster. This pandemic is a growth-induced disaster, harbinger of more to come. Drives for growth have accelerated global flows of material and money, paving the way for lightning-fast circulation of bodies and diseases. The economic policies and social arrangements proposed by degrowth offer ways to make such situations more liveable and just, to emerge stronger and better post-crisis, and to reorient practices and politics towards care and community solidarity. The end of growth will not necessarily involve a smooth transition. It may very well be unplanned, unwilled, and messy, in conditions not of our own choosing. Conditions like the ones we are living through now. History often evolves with punctuations; periods of seeming paralysis can reach a tipping point, when unexpected events open new possibilities and violently close others. The COVID-19 pandemic is such an event. Suddenly, things take radical new directions, and the unthinkable becomes thinkable, for better or for worse. Severe economic depression led to Roosevelt’s New Deal, and also to Hitler’s Third Reich. What are the possibilities and dangers now? Amid this pandemic, many scientific, political, and moral authorities are communicating the message that caring for people’s health and wellbeing should come before profit, and that is great. A resurgence of a care ethic that we advocate in our forthcoming book [The Case for Degrowth](https://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9781509535620) is evident in the willingness of people to stay home to protect their elders, and in the spirit of duty and sacrifice among care and health workers. Of course, many stay home also because they fear the virus and worry about themselves, or to avoid police fines. And many care workers go to work because they must earn a living. Acting collectively against crises, pandemic, or climate change requires such combinations of sacrifice and solidarity, self and collective interest, government interventions and people’s participation. Deep inequalities are coming into play in new ways. Residents of some countries are suffering different, and sometimes more severe, hardships than those of others, as are those who are deprived of full citizenship in prisons, migrant labor camps, and refugee settlements. Within each country, actors differentiated by gender, racial, socioeconomic, and occupational positions suffer different vulnerabilities in the face of the disease, and of the economic downturns that follow. Data from countries around the world show that [COVID tends to be much more severe and deadly in men](https://www.livescience.com/why-covid-19-more-severe-men.html) than in women. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show a disproportionate burden of illness and death among [racial and ethnic minority groups](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html). Nurses, health aids, and caretakers, positions in which women prevail, are especially vulnerable to infection. As are millions of men working in essential jobs including sanitation, trucking, taxi-driving, and meat packing. These jobs, in very large majority performed by men, were already among the most dangerous occupations before adding exposure to coronavirus. While some have the luxury of sheltering at home, others must choose between unemployment without an adequate safety net and working at jobs that expose them to the coronavirus. Yet, unless whole populations are protected, not even the wealthiest are fully safe from contagion. In this crisis, like others before, [people have mobilized and self-organized](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/31/virus-neighbours-covid-19) where businesses and governments have failed to provide for their needs – from mutual aid groups delivering food and medicines for elders, to groups of doctors, engineers, and hackers collaborating to 3-D print components for oxygen ventilators, to students babysitting the children of doctors and nurses. The proliferation of caring and commoning endeavors, which form the bedrock of the degrowth societies we envision, are all the more commendable given the contagious nature of the virus. After the pandemic is over, and the difficult path of economic reconstruction starts, this resurgent dynamism of commoning and care will be vital. Positive impulses among individuals and grassroots networks are necessary but not sufficient for sustained change. We need governments to secure healthcare for all, protect the environment, and provide economic safety nets. [The degrowth-supporting policies](https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/can-we-prosper-without-growth-10-policy-proposals/) we advocate were necessary before the pandemic, and are more so during and after: a Green New Deal and public investment program, work-sharing, a basic care income, universal public services, and support for community economies. So is the reorganization of public finance through measures including carbon fees, caps on wealth and high incomes, taxes on natural resource use, and pollution. Whereas degrowth debates have traditionally focused on demobilizing resource-intensive and ecologically damaging aspects of current economies, [pandemic responses](https://tribunemag.co.uk/2020/03/the-anti-wartime-economy) deal with demobilizing those aspects not immediately essential for sustaining life. We coincide in facing the fundamental challenge of managing political economies without growth during and after the pandemic: how to demobilize parts of the capitalist economy while securing the provisioning of basic goods and services, experimenting with resource-light ways of enjoying ourselves, and finding collective meanings in life. Radical proposals are already being considered and selectively adopted across the political spectrum as they provide concrete solutions amid the pandemic. Companies and governments have reduced working hours and implemented work-sharing; different forms of basic income are being debated; financial measures have been instituted to subsidize workers in the quarantine period and after businesses close; an international campaign for [care income](https://globalwomenstrike.net/) has been launched; governments have engaged the productive apparatus to secure vital supplies and services; and moratoriums are being considered or imposed on rent, mortgage, and debt payments. There is growing understanding that vast government spending will be required. The world will change after the pandemic, and there will be struggles over which paths to take. People will have to fight to direct change toward more equitable and resilient societies that have gentler impacts on humans and natural environments. Powerful actors will try to reconstitute status quo arrangements, and to shift costs to those with less power. It takes organizing and a confluence of alliances and circumstances to ensure that it won’t be the environment and the workers who pay the bill, but those who profited most from the growth that preceded this disaster. [Degrowth is not forced deprivation](https://vocabulary.degrowth.org/), but an aspiration to secure enough for everyone to live with dignity and without fear; to experience friendship, love, and health; to be able to give and receive care; to enjoy leisure and nature, and to legitimize a life that it is also an experience of interdependence and vulnerability. This goal will not be met by subsidizing fossil fuel companies, airlines, cruise ships, hotels, and tourism mega-businesses. Instead, states need to finance Green New Deals and rebuild their health and care infrastructures, creating jobs in a just transition to economies that are less environmentally damaging. As oil prices fall, fossil fuels should be taxed heavily, raising funds to support green and social investments, and to provide tax breaks and dividends to working people. Rather than using public money to bail out corporations and banks, we urge the establishment of a [basic care income](https://comune-info.net/reddito-di-cura/) that will help people and communities to reconstruct their lives and livelihoods. These fundamental questions related to the strategies for socio-ecological transformation will be at the center of the [international Vienna degrowth conference](https://www.degrowthvienna2020.org/en/landing-page/) taking place as an online event in late May 2020. A good starting point are the principles for the recovery of the economy and the basis of creating a just society contained in the open letter [‘Degrowth: New Roots for the Economy’](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/degrowth-new-roots-economy/). This crisis arguably opens up more dangers than it does possibilities. We worry about the politics of fear that the coronavirus pandemic engenders, the intensification of surveillance and control of peoples’ movements, xenophobia and blame of others, as well as home isolation that curbs commoning and political organizing. Once measures such as curfews, quarantines, rule-by-decree, border controls, or election postponements are taken, they can easily become part of the arsenal of political possibility, opening dystopian horizons. To counter these risks, degrowth motivates and guides us to re-found societies on the commons of mutual aid and care, orienting collective pursuits away from growth and toward wellbeing and equity. These are not just lofty aspirations; in our forthcoming book [The Case for Degrowth](https://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9781509535620) we identify everyday practices and concrete policies to start building the world we want today, together with political strategies to support synergy among these efforts in the construction of equitable and low-impact societies. This book is unlike any other on degrowth, in that it is the first to try to address the hard question of ‘how to’ in the current political conjuncture. Before the pandemic, we had to work hard to convince people of the case for degrowth. Our job may be somewhat easier now amid such tangible evidence that the current system is crumbling under its own weight. As we embark on the second major global economic crisis in a dozen years, perhaps some of us will be more willing to question the wisdom of producing and consuming more and more, just to keep the system going. The time is ripe for us to refocus on what really matters: not GDP, but the health and wellbeing of our people and our planet.

#### Growth-driven tech innovation proliferates and advances the technology necessary to conduct bioterrorism.

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Whatever the actual potential of these technologies, it is clear that a powerful technological imaginary exists among policy makers, technologists, and economists that contributes to an unshakeable faith in innovation and human ingenuity to solve the decoupling challenge. Degrowth proponents have so far mainly challenged this optimism by emphasizing the limited potential of renewable energy due to its intermittency and high land and raw material demands (e.g. Kallis, 2018). However, this may downplay the (at least theoretical) potential for convergent breakthroughs in nanotechnology, synthetic biology, and AI to vastly improve renewable energy efficiency and storage systems while designing new materials to substitute for depleting minerals (Diamandis and Kotler, 2014). More broadly, while degrowthers have to some extent considered individual FIR technologies (particularly AI and biotechnology) (e.g. Kallis, 2018; Kerschner et al., 2018), they have yet to address their convergent and mutually amplifying character, which leaves them vulnerable to the arguments of techno-optimists. Of course, the revolutionary promise of these technologies may fail to materialize, and, given the magnitude of the decoupling challenge, degrowth advocates are right to be skeptical. However, due to irreducible uncertainty combined with the ‘exponential’ and ‘revolutionary’ potential of the FIR (Schwab, 2017), even more rigorous critical assessments would always be insufficient in the eyes of the techno-optimists. Therefore, an alternative line of response should also be pursued: what if the FIR does succeed in decoupling economic growth from total environmental impact? What unintended consequences then might this give rise to?3 Dual-use technologies and the democratization of violence First, we must consider that all these are ‘dual-use technologies’, or technologies with potential both for economic productivity and violence. As Blum and Wittes (2015, p. 2) explain, these technologies are driving a trend referred to as the ‘democratization of violence’ in which the ‘destructive power once reserved to states is now the potential province of individuals’. Rather than simply a matter of creating new individual weapons, Blum and Wittes (2015, pp. 39, 7-8) emphasize that convergent FIR technologies are generating ‘whole technological fields – a series of breakthroughs in basic science and engineering’ that ‘generate creativity in their users to build and invent new things, new weapons, and new modes of attack’. And to compound the problem, while FIR technologies empower individuals to kill and provoke systemic chaos unlike any other time in history, they also empower states to monitor the minute details of private and public life and potentially constrict individual and collective freedoms, while the unprecedented threats enabled by these same technologies will likely reinforce governmental efforts to intensify securitization as deeply as is technologically feasible. Blum and Wittes summarize the emerging predicament as follows: How should we think about the relationship between liberty and security when we both rely on governments to protect us from radically empowered fellow citizens around the globe and also fear the power those same technologies give to governments? (Blum and Wittes, 2015, p. 13) Blum and Wittes do not consider how the earth system crisis will intersect with these threats, either as a positive or negative feedback. But it should be clear that, in a world of FIR-driven sustainability solutions, they would inevitably intensify, and it is thus necessary to consider what new problems and governmental responses they would engender.4 Without claiming to exhaustively describe the security risks created by the FIR, I will focus on three emerging areas of concern: biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state securitization, and will then discuss how they may collectively generate a spiral of insecurity and securitization. Biotechnology and the emerging terrain of biosecurity To begin with biosecurity, both the promise and peril of biotechnology – particularly the still nascent field of synthetic biology – is its immense creative potential. As a recent report from the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) describes: synthetic biology is expected to (1) expand the range of what could be produced, including making bacteria and viruses more harmful; (2) decrease the amount of time required to engineer such organisms; and (3) expand the range of actors who could undertake such efforts. (NAS, 2018, p. 4) For example, manipulating DNA structures in microorganisms can make certain agents more virulent, improve their resistance to antibiotics and vaccines, make them less detectable by already limited surveillance systems, transform harmless microorganisms into deadly ones, and make pathogens more resilient to diverse atmospheric conditions, thus increasing their lifespan (Charlet, 2018; NAS, 2018). At present these capabilities remain limited and dependent on highly advanced techniques and laboratory equipment, which is why most experts believe there have to date been no mass casualty bioterror attacks (NAS, 2018). However, the NAS notes that improvements in synthesis technology have followed a ‘Moore’s Law–like’ curve for both reductions in costs and increases in the length of constructs that are attainable’, and that ‘these trends are likely to continue’ (NAS, 2018, pp. 18–19). Moreover, automated DNA synthesis techniques remove much of the time-consuming and technically difficult aspects of manipulating DNA, further reducing barriers to access (Wintle et al., 2017). And in the future, experts warn that ‘convergent capabilities’ between synthetic biology, information technology, nanotechnology, and 3D printing may enable ‘sudden’ breakthroughs in bioweaponization (e.g. by improving bio-agent stability and delivery, providing advance[d]s aerosolization capability, and accelerating the ‘Design-and-Build’ cycle) (NAS, 2018, p. 87). The possibilities of bio-weaponization will expand as these techniques diffuse, which are already enabling the formation of a ‘DIYbio’ movement in which amateur scientists, inventors, and others are increasingly ‘capable of doing at home what just a few years ago was only possible in the most advanced university, government or industry laboratories’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1109). The new CRIPSR/Cas9 gene editing technique further expands the range of genomic tinkering available to individuals, which has been widely embraced by the DIYbio community as a powerful tool that ‘makes it easy, cheap, and fast to move genes around – any genes, in any living thing’ (Maxmen, 2015). The capacities of DIY biohackers remain limited in important ways, though the trends described above suggests they will continue to increase as barriers to advanced bio-weaponization fall (NAS, 2018). And while the risks are evident, the democratization of these techniques may also facilitate the diffusion and customization of local solutions to environmental and health challenges while enhancing popular participation in the direction of biotechnological evolution away from transnational corporate dominance (Bennett et al., 2009). We can therefore say that these emerging technologies pose a unique kind of ‘security dilemma’: while their development and diffusion may strengthen local and global capacities to solve environmental challenges, they may also imperil global security by unleashing uniquely powerful and complex violence capabilities. Synthetic biology is only in its early stages, and governments from the UK to China aim to ‘accelerate [its] industrialization and commercialization’ in order ‘to drive economic growth’ and ‘develop solutions to key challenges across the bioeconomy, spanning health, chemicals, advanced materials, energy, food, security and environmental protection’ (Synthetic Biology Leadership Council, 2016, pp. 13, 4). If calls for emergency action to exponentially expand the green economy indeed accelerate these trends (Falk et al., 2018), then by 2030 (and more so by 2040) we will live in a world where genetically engineered biofuels dramatically increase, genetic tinkering with crop varieties is normalized to enhance agricultural resilience, and gene drives are deployed to control old and new disease vectors intensified by climate change (among other potential applications), which would exponentially expand the number of individuals with biotech expertise and access to the needed equipment. Therefore, while we have yet to experience a catastrophic bioterror attack, rapid advances in synthetic biology are nonetheless creating a ‘black swan waiting to happen’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1110), and the risk is that such black swans could become increasingly ‘normal’ if this technology becomes a key engine of economic growth and green technological innovation.

#### Extinction — non-state actors will deploy.

Barratt et al. ‘17 (Owen Cotton-Barratt et al; PhD in Pure Mathematics, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”; pg. 9; <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>)

Recent developments in biotechnology may, however, give people the capability to design pathogens which overcome this trade-off. Some gain-of-function research has demonstrated the feasibility of altering pathogens to create strains with dangerous new features, such as vaccine-resistant smallpox40 and human-transmissible avian flu,41 with the potential to kill millions or even billions of people. For an engineered pathogen to derail humanity’s long-term future, it would probably have to have extremely high fatality rates or destroy reproductive capability (so that it killed or prevented reproduction by all or nearly all of its victims), be extremely infectious (so that it had global reach), and have delayed onset of symptoms (so that we would fail to notice the problem and mount a response in time).42 Making such a pathogen would be close to impossible at present. However, the cost of the technology is falling rapidly,43 and adequate expertise and modern laboratories are becoming more available. Consequently, states and perhaps even terrorist groups could eventually gain the capacity to create pathogens which could deliberately or accidentally cause an existential catastrophe.

### 1NC---AT: Heg

#### No leadership impact---empirics.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

# 2NC

## CP---Adv

#### International coop solves disease

PATH ’17 [PATH is the leader in global health innovation. An international nonprofit organization, we save lives and improve health, especially among women and children. We accelerate innovation across five platforms—vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, devices, and system and service innovations—that harness our entrepreneurial insight, scientific and public health expertise, and passion for health equity. By mobilizing partners around the world, we take innovation to scale, working alongside countries primarily in Africa and Asia to tackle their greatest health needs. Together, we deliver measurable results that disrupt the cycle of poor health; October; *Healthier World, Safer America A US Government Roadmap for International Action to Prevent the Next Pandemic*; <https://www.path.org/resources/healthier-world-safer-america-a-us-government-roadmap-for-international-action-to-prevent-the-next-pandemic/>; accessed 11/29/18//MSCOTT]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Pandemics can emerge quickly and rapidly, resulting in catastrophic loss of life, billions and even trillions in economic losses, and global instability which transcends sovereign borders. Too often we fall into the trap of addressing pandemic threats only after they become crises, repeating the cycle of global panic and emergency spending, followed by waning interest as the outbreak subsides, ultimately leading to inaction and complacency. The international efforts that have been launched with strong US leadership and financing in the wake of the Ebola crisis have begun to show results. Experts and leaders around the world have agreed that prioritizing strategic initiatives that sustainably bolster pandemic preparedness and global health security is needed to ensure that recent gains are not lost and that progress is maintained. To truly protect Americans and populations worldwide, the United States should continue to assert its global leadership and expertise to accelerate international progress on pandemic preparedness; build and implement a wholeof-government global health security strategy; invest in R&D for emerging disease threats; and provide dedicated and sustained funding for these efforts. Commitment to global health security mean will the next local outbreak will be stopped, before the headlines carry the news of another deadly, costly, and unnecessary pandemic.

US global health leadership

• Maintain consistent, high-level US political support for the next phase of implementation and expansion of the GHSA, taking concerted action in line with public declarations that strengthens global prevention, detection, and rapid response to emerging health threats abroad is a priority for the US government.

• Leverage available diplomatic and multilateral financing channels to motivate partner countries, specifically at-risk countries, to achieve and sustain compliance with the IHRs; using the US voice and vote at the United Nations, WHO, World Bank Group, and other relevant international health, development, and security platforms.

An international action plan

• Develop and implement a US plan for international action in accordance with the structure set forth in the standing Executive Order Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats. This action plan should prioritize and articulate the US government’s role in advancing preparedness in low- and middle-income countries and catalyze R&D for disease threats, supported with clear and measurable indicators for progress.

• Designate senior-level oversight to achieve full implementation of the guidance outlined in the Executive Order and action plan, including ensuring coordinated support to US Chiefs of Mission and country teams to facilitate country preparedness for biological threats, and monitoring and evaluating progress toward global health security targets.

• Prioritize global health security—especially the role of building low- and middle-income country capacity to contain pandemic threats—in all relevant future global and national health, R&D, and biodefense strategies, including the National Health Security Strategy, the National Security Strategy, and the National Biodefense Strategy.

• Map the potential contributions of the nongovernmental sector to global health security and identify opportunities to catalyze multisectoral partnerships among the US government, private, and social sectors that will harness new allies, innovations, and investments to bolster pandemic preparedness.

Research and development

• Develop a new generation and robust pipeline of medical countermeasures—including appropriate drugs and technologies that are reflective of robust surveillance data—for infectious and emerging diseases with pandemic potential, allowing the US to quickly prevent an outbreak from becoming a pandemic.

• Enable the development and deployment of incentives to proactively and sustainably engage the private sector in medical product development for infectious and emerging diseases with pandemic potential to capitalize on the resources, expertise, and other skills of industry. This includes expanding government driven incentive mechanisms like the BARDA to financially support R&D for an expanded set of infectious and emerging diseases to bring industry partners to the table.

• Contribute US scientific and financial leadership to multilateral efforts to accelerate R&D on emerging pandemic threats, including through CEPI, the G20’s R&D Collaboration Hub for antimicrobial clinical research and product development, and regional regulatory harmonization initiatives in endemic disease regions.

Dedicated, Sustained US Government financing

• Ensure a whole-of-government approach to global health security financing including dedicated and sustained funding for CDC, USAID, DOD, and DOS programming and personnel.

• Starting in FY2019, increase the annual base funding for global health security-related activities at CDC and USAID to ensure these agencies can continue their programming after the Ebola supplemental funding expires. To bridge the gap between the supplemental and core appropriations, USAID’s Emerging Pandemic Threats budget should increase from $72.5 million to $172.5 million, and CDC’s Division of Global Health Protection budget should increase from $58.2 million to $208.2 million.

• Ensure agencies have access to an emergency reserve fund to initiate an early and rapid response to emerging pandemic threats, allowing USAID and CDC to each retain up to $70 million if and when needed. The reserve fund should be replenished once it is used to ensure funds are available for the next outbreak, and should not be interchangeable with annual appropriations or previously allocated emergency funding, nor borrowed from other global health or development programs, which would derail progress inother critical areas.

• Maintain US support for global health programs that build core public health capabilities and bolster frontline preparedness—including PEPFAR, PMI, GPEI, and Child and Maternal Survival programs.

• Provide sustained and predictable investment across the US government in R&D for diseases with pandemic potential, to advance both the foundational knowledge of pathogens and the development of medical countermeasures.

#### R&D and pandemic preparedness solve

1AC Plump 5-18 (Andy Plump is the president for research and development at Takeda Pharmaceuticals and a cofounder of the Covid R&D Alliance. 5-18-2021, accessed on 6-12-2021, STAT, "The world needs to start preparing now for the next pandemic", <https://www.statnews.com/2021/05/18/luck-is-not-a-strategy-the-world-needs-to-start-preparing-now-for-the-next-pandemic/>)

As countries grapple with the worst global pandemic in a century, it’s hard to think about preparing for the next one. But if we don’t, it could be worse than Covid-19. Over the last 30 years, infectious disease outbreaks have emerged with alarming regularity. The World Health Organization lists an influenza pandemic and other high-threat viral diseases such as Ebola and dengue among the top 10 biggest threats to public health. The rate of animal-to-human transmission of viruses has been increasing, with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimating that 75% of new infectious diseases in humans come from animals. These zoonotic infections can have profound effects on human life. The overall infection fatality rate is around 10% for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), between 40% and 75% for Nipah virus, and as high as 88% for Ebola. While the infection fatality rate for Covid-19 is lower — likely less than 1% — the overall burden of death has been significantly higher since it has affected so many people, more than 160 million people as I write this. Luck is not a pandemic strategy Although the Covid-19 pandemic has been a human and health care disaster, by scientific measures the world was lucky this time. Covid-19 was far less lethal than its predecessors, less contagious than previous pandemic viruses, and we were able to quickly develop a cadre of effective vaccines. But luck is not a strategy. The same way the U.S. invests in and prepares for national defense, it must also prepare for another pandemic. Though the next viral outbreak cannot be prevented, the next pandemic can — but only with better preparation. There is no doubt that the global pharmaceutical industry, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and health care systems should have been better prepared for Covid-19 in part because the coronavirus that causes it, known as SARS-CoV-2, is closely related to other coronaviruses, particularly the one that caused the outbreak of SARS in 2003. In fact, coronavirus core proteins often share upward of 95% of their nucleic acid or protein sequences due to their close origins. In some cases, their active sites — the pockets to which antiviral therapies bind — are 100% identical. In short, coronaviruses are highly related, and where it counts they share complete or near complete identity. Had the drug discovery efforts initiated during the 2003 SARS epidemic been continued and come to fruition, antiviral medications to treat Covid-19 would have been on the shelf to help contain the pandemic, or at least better treat Covid-19 patients. Unfortunately, those efforts were abandoned once SARS seemed under control because there was no apparent market and no infrastructure to support ongoing research. The response to Covid-19 — if it can be sustained — suggests hope for the future and a springboard for preparedness, especially immediate and ongoing collaborations across the biopharmaceutical industry, academia, and government. Walls came down. Collaboration flourished. A tremendous amount of good science was conducted in diagnostics and clinical management, and the world witnessed spectacular efforts in vaccine development. The urgency of the crisis and the speed of drug development led the biopharmaceutical industry and governmental bodies to work in concert, streamlining regulatory processes in ways that must continue moving forward once the coronavirus crisis ends. Rethinking traditional practices is essential to pandemic preparedness, which must be approached with the same mindset as countries approach defense, with the goal of establishing a unified global bulwark against future disease outbreaks. Establish and fund infrastructure for collaboration Global health crises require organized structures and leadership. Governments and the biopharma industry need to create and coordinate a joint pandemic preparedness ecosystem. Such a structure would help governments, industry, academia, and others focus on their respective strengths for greater efficiency, partnerships, and preemptive research. Related: Real-time gene sequencing can help control — and may someday prevent — pandemics In March 2020, two dozen R&D leaders from the world’s leading biopharma companies, including my company, Takeda, came together to form the Covid R&D Alliance. It is showing that this type of industry collaboration is possible by rapidly assembling and coordinating therapeutic responses to the pandemic. At the national and international levels, this alliance and others are beginning to undertake early work to get ahead of drug development in advance of the next pandemic. But this effort must quickly be solidified before momentum and motivation are lost. The massive human suffering and economic impact of Covid-19 underscore the significant investment that must be made for future preparedness. Dedicated public and private funding of such an effort would demonstrate a commitment to global health care and create a defense against future pandemics that is founded on science and independent from political rhetoric. Identify leading threats and identify therapies for them The perpetrators of the next pandemic will likely come from the coronavirus or influenza families. Other possible culprits include flaviviruses such as the West Nile virus, filoviruses such as the Ebola virus, and alphaviruses known to associate with a number of human encephalitis diseases. Using a list like this to guide its work, the biopharmaceutical industry needs to begin creating an arsenal of antiviral molecules. Given the impossibility of predicting the future, it will be important to focus on broadly active compounds where possible, and virus-specific compounds to fill in gaps. In the coronavirus family, for example, SARS-CoV-2 is similar in structure to the 2003 SARS virus, and the virus that causes Middle East respiratory syndrome is only slightly different. It should be possible to develop a single antiviral molecule to be effective against all three. If a three-fer isn’t possible, then specific therapies should be developed for each potential pathogen. All therapeutic candidates should be evaluated against diverse viral strains as markers of future potential efficacy in future epidemics. There is no business model for preparing for a future pandemic. Without specific catalysts, interest in preparing for this unknown is likely to wane as Covid-19 comes under control. Whether it’s because businesses are thinking of investors, media, academia, or other audiences, the tendency is to go where the spotlight is shining — which would be a disaster for pandemic preparedness. What’s needed is a competitive environment to stimulate innovation. But without an established or obvious market, the necessary investment and entrepreneurism won’t materialize. Enabling future pandemic therapeutic preparedness will require establishing a novel, collaborative ecosystem in which biopharma companies, nongovernmental organizations, governments, academia, and other stakeholders are able to share information and coordinate areas of focus to maximize the collective efforts. The success of the whole will depend on the willingness and success of each individual piece. To prepare for the next viral pandemic, governments and nongovernmental organizations need to focus on preparing health care infrastructure and viral surveillance to predict the next outbreak. At the same time, academia and the pharmaceutical industry must focus on drug discovery, particularly antiviral therapies. These efforts must seamlessly interface. To enable future preparedness, the biopharmaceutical industry should leverage the ways of working that emerged during Covid-19 that included sharing assays, models, and data while concurrently focusing on competitive innovation. With the right level of coordination, and without massive resources, an arsenal of antiviral molecules can be created and tested on healthy human volunteers so the world has them at the ready for Phase 2 trials when threats emerge. Pandemic readiness will also require agility and an ability to adapt rapidly to the unknown. Estimates suggest the existence of 500,000 animal viruses with spillover potential to humans, with a small fraction of these (250 or so) having already made the jump. We must be ready for the perpetrators from poorly studied or poorly understood viral families, as well as the entirely new threats that evolution will create. Focusing on known pathogens is a critical first step in therapeutic preparedness, but the industry must also be ready to start entirely new programs with minimal notice.

### O/V ⁠— 2NC

#### A ⁠— single industries, which are each a separate topic ⁠— here’s a short list

Select USA No Date, (Select USA, No Date, “INDUSTRIES”, <https://www.selectusa.gov/industries>)

The United States is home to the most innovative and productive companies in the world, forming a diverse and competitive group of industry sectors. The U.S. industries highlighted here are exceptionally dynamic and represent key opportunities for global growth and success.

Aerospace

Agribusiness

Automotive

Biopharmaceuticals

Chemicals

Consumer Goods

Energy

Environmental Technology

Financial Services

Logistics and Transportation

Machinery and Equipment

Media and Entertainment

Medical Technology

Professional Services

Retail Trade

Software and IT Services

Textiles

Travel, Tourism, and Hospitality

#### B ⁠— 32 million companies

FedCommunities 21, (FedCommunities, 9-9-2021, “Small-business owners: Share your experiences with credit access this past year,” FedCommunities <https://fedcommunities.org/data/2021-take-federal-reserve-small-businesses-credit-survey/>)

There are 32.5 million small businesses in the United States. That’s 32.5 million stories of small-business ownership. Representative data drawn from these stories can shed light on more universal experiences.

#### Antitrust prohibitions can be global

Hamer et al. 16, partner in Baker & McKenzie's Washington, DC office and Chair of the Firm’s North American Antitrust and Competition Practice Group. Celina Joachim is a partner in Baker McKenzie's Houston office and certified in labor and employment law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. She represents management in all aspects of labor and employment law, including employment arbitration, litigation, counseling, and traditional labor law. Cynthia Jackson is a partner in the Compliance Group in Baker & McKenzie's Palo Alto office (Mark H. Hamer, 11-15-2016, “US Federal Agencies Issue Joint Guidance for HR Professionals Warning of Criminal Liability for Wage-Fixing and No-Poaching Agreements,” Global Compliance News, <https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/2016/11/15/us-issues-guidance-for-hr-professionals-wage-fixing-20161110/>)

US antitrust prohibitions can apply to global conduct when there is a negative effect on competition in the United States. For instance, agreements between non-US companies, or transactions driven outside of the US, that include US compensation data, wage or benefit sharing, and/or no-hire / no poach or wage fixing agreements which impact US workforces will be in violation of this new guidance and constitute unlawful antitrust agreements. Multinational employers should therefore be mindful of sharing data or entering into such restrictive agreements where they involve US workforces.

#### AND specific products

Markham 11, Marshall P. Madison Professor of Law, The University of San Francisco School of Law (Jesse W. Markham Jr., 2011, “LESSONS FOR COMPETITION LAW FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE PROSPECT FOR ANTITRUST RESPONSES TO THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL,” PHENOMENON” , FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW, Vol. 16, Issue 2, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1281&context=jcfl>)

A merger is not the only setting in which antitrust champions scale efficiencies. At the retail level, economies of scale constitute a legitimate reason for a manufacturer to limit intrabrand competition by imposing vertical restraints.92 Antitrust law also generally tolerates combinations of competitors into joint ventures to achieve economies of scale, with the presence of such efficiencies removing a challenge from the application of per se condemnation and establishing a facially plausible justification for the concerted activity.93 Removing conduct from per se illegality comes close to legalizing it, given the rarity of plaintiff successes in challenging the conduct under the rule of reason.94 [begin footnote 94] 94. One rare successful challenge under the rule of reason is found in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a case that is indicative of the difficulties plaintiffs face under Post-Chicago School antitrust rules. In that case the FTC challenged an agreement between competing record companies to suspend advertising and discounting of two record albums temporarily during the launch period for a jointly-produced recording. The court affirmed the FTC’s application of the rule of reason to the challenged agreement, even though it involved competitors agreeing not to put specific products on sale for a period of time – a collusive restriction on price and advertising that in an earlier era probably would have met with per se condemnation. [end footnote 94]

### AT: Not Homogenous ⁠— 2NC

#### 2 ⁠— no intent to define ⁠— it’s about “developing countries”

Waler and Hofstetter 16, (Katharina Walker is Advisor for vocational skills development and Helvetas’ youth focal person. Sonja Hofstetter joined Swisscontact in Cambodia in July 2016. She is the Quality Assurance Manager and Deputy Team Leader of the Skills Development Programme. “ Study on Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education and Training (ATVET) in Developing Countries” Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, Global Programme Food Security, 25.1.2016, <https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Agriculture-and-Food-Security/focusareas/Documents/ras_capex_ATVET_Study_2016.pdf> , date accessed 7/19/21)

In many developing countries, the private sector1 [BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1] 1 The private sector is not perceived as a homogenous mass even though the terminology might suggest this to be the case. In this study, the term “private sector” is used to circumscribe the various actors such as small and medium sized companies, large companies, sectorial associations, business associations, chambers of commerce, etc[END FOOTNOTE 1] faces challenges in finding adequately skilled employees. This also holds true for sectors linked to agriculture, e.g. processing, distribution, marketing, etc. The development of ATVET from a purely productivity-oriented approach to provide broader and more specialised skills sets along agricultural value chains is likely to raise the interest of private sector actors. This incentive can result in a stronger and more sustainable financial and conceptual engagement of employers in ATVET.

### AT: Overlimiting/Aff Ground ⁠— 2NC

#### A ⁠— changing the consumer welfare standard

Steinbaum 18 (inserted), the research director and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute; and Maurice E. Stucke, co-founder of the law firm, the KonkurrenzGroup, and a law professor at the University of Tennessee (Marshall Steinbaum, September 2018, “A NEW STANDARD FOR ANTITRUST: THE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD: IN PRACTICE,” Roosevelt Institute, <https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Effective-Competition-Standard-brief-201809.pdf>)

Today’s economy has a market power problem. Consumers are paying higher prices; new entrants face tougher barriers; workers have little power to demand competitive wages and benefits and less mobility to leave for a better offer; and suppliers often can’t reach the market without paying powerful intermediaries for the privilege. The available economic data all point to declining competition, increasing concentration, less innovation, and widening wealth and income inequality. There are many drivers of our market power problem. One significant factor is weak antitrust law and enforcement. Over the past 35 years, Americans have paid the price for a “consumer welfare” standard, which the courts created and interpreted in ways that neither benefit consumers nor their welfare. After nearly four decades, no consensus exists on what the consumer welfare standard actually means. While it is intended to prevent monopolies from charging higher prices, it has failed even on this measure, as the empirical evidence reveals. Moreover, the consumer welfare standard ignores vast segments of the economy, including the adverse effects of mergers, powerful buyers, and unilateral restraints on upstream suppliers and workers. With such price-centric tools, the U.S. competition agencies often cannot assess how mergers and restraints will impact what is increasingly important in the 21st century economy, namely quality, privacy, and innovation. Exacerbating the shortcomings of this “consumer welfare” standard is the courts’ unwieldy, case-by-case rule-of-reason analysis, which is too costly and time-consuming for anyone other than a well-financed plaintiff to undertake. The inability to bring and win antitrust cases, in turn, allows market power to fester and accumulate unchallenged, and exploitative and predatory business models that were once illegal have since become legal. Under the current antitrust regime, our market power problem will likely worsen. Nor will the Supreme Court likely reorient antitrust to its original purpose. Thus, a new standard is needed to restore competition. We propose the effective competition standard as an alternative that would revive the original aims of antitrust law—to preserve competitive market structures. Under the effective competition standard: “Agencies and courts shall use the preservation of competitive market structures that protect individuals, purchasers, consumers, and producers; preserve opportunities for competitors; promote individual autonomy and well-being; and disperse private power as the principal objective of the federal antitrust laws.” In practice, the new effective competition standard restores the proper focus on market structures; expands the stakeholders that should be taken into account when assessing anticompetitive harms to include all those who are, in fact, harmed by anticompetitive conduct; appropriately recognizes that competition needs competitors; and returns antitrust law to its proper role in dispersing private power. There are a number of ways to implement this new standard. First, we recommend that Congress codify the above principles, in order to assure that courts construe the antitrust laws in ways that protect the interests of the majority, rather than the interests of powerful firms, and circumscribe courts from arbitrarily reaching standards or results that contribute to the market power problem. In addition, we recommend a series of specific changes to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. As a result, courts would rely far less on the Supreme Court’s rule-of-reason framework and far more on simpler legal presumptions and rules that lawyers can easily explain to their clients—and that impose greater accountability on the courts and agencies. This includes creating stronger presumptions in merger review to prevent dominant firms from acquiring rivals and mergers in concentrated markets, as well as tougher positions on monopolies and monopsonies. No longer can the Supreme Court, under its consumer welfare standard, condone monopolies charging high prices as “an important element of the free-market system,” especially when this is inconsistent with our social, moral, and political values and contrary to the economic evidence. The effective competition standard will reorient courts and enforcers to look more often upstream, protecting the right of market access and casting a skeptical eye on vertical restraints. To that end, we propose the following specific legislative changes:

ESTABLISH A NEW, CLEARER SET OF INDICES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A FIRM HAS MARKET POWER

Current law requires plaintiffs or enforcement agencies to prove that there is high concentration in a narrowly defined market prior to showing anticompetitive behavior or demonstrating that a proposed merger would cause harm. In Ohio v. American Express, the Supreme Court required the plaintiffs to prove the defendant’s market power by showing concentration, which is circumstantial evidence of market power at best, when direct evidence of market power was available. Now private plaintiffs and enforcement agencies in cases involving vertical restraints will have to define a relevant market, often a costly, timeconsuming endeavor, using antitrust’s price-centric tools, and then calculate the defendant’s market share in that market, then show that the market share is high enough to infer the defendant’s market power, even when plaintiffs have strong evidence of the restraint’s anticompetitive effects. This circumvents legal standards and economics. Rather than one sole criterion for market power—a high market share in an antitrust market—antitrust law should allow plaintiffs to offer direct and circumstantial evidence of market power, including observable direct indicia of market power on which anticompetitive claims may be premised. As many scholars have argued, high market shares are dispositive neither in favor of nor against market power, and therefore a broader range of indicia are necessary. Indeed, as the economic evidence reflects, firms with low market shares nonetheless can at times exercise significant market power upstream against suppliers and workers. These indicia should include:

• The unilateral ability to set prices or wages, or to charge prices in excess of the competitive level;

• The ability to price or wage discriminate;

• The ability to impose disadvantageous non-price contractual terms on counterparties or revise contractual terms in one’s own favor;

• The ability to exclude competitors; and

• Profits or payouts to shareholders in excess of a firm’s cost of capital for an extended period of time.

UPDATE MONOPOLIZATION/MONOPSONIZATION POLICY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE, UNILATERAL CONDUCT BY A FIRM UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Under the Supreme Court’s current consumer welfare standard, monopolies have little to fear, as the Court has significantly limited their potential liability for their anticompetitive actions. Predatory pricing cases have all but disappeared. Courts now opine that monopolies have no duty to deal. And for all of these anticompetitive actions, courts must entertain “efficiency” defenses—as though any illegal act might be rectified by some larger benefit to society, a standard that exists in no other area of law. In this landscape, it is unsurprising that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has brought only one monopolization case since 1999. (In contrast, the DOJ, between 1970 and 1972, brought 39 civil and 3 criminal cases against monopolies and oligopolies.)

We recommend the following new test for determining when a firm engages in illegal anticompetitive conduct unilaterally under the effective competition standard. Namely, the plaintiff must show that:

• First, the defendant has, and exercises, significant market power, in accordance with one of more of the indicia outlined above;

• Second, this power excludes some potential competition and/or limits or has limited some actual competition; and

• Third, this power is not attributable solely to a defendant’s ability, economies of scale, research, or natural advantages.

Next, as part of streamlining enforcement against unilateral conduct, the effective competition standard entails establishing certain actions as presumptive violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, including:

• Otherwise unlawful conduct that helps a firm attain or maintain monopoly or monopsony power;

• Predatory pricing below marginal cost for an extended period of time, for the purpose of excluding competitors and preserving market power, without the need for plaintiffs to prove “recoupment.”

• Simpler standards for assessing when refusals to deal and exclusive dealing are illegal, including when they violate suppliers’ right of market access.

• “Cheap exclusion,” or actions on the part of a dominant firm that cost little, that are intended to exclude, disadvantage, or discriminate against competitors within its market, and that do not improve efficiency.

To make clear that a range of harms are to be considered when a firm engages in price discrimination, we additionally recommend amending Section 2 of the Clayton Act to prohibit price discrimination where it hurts consumers overall, as is the concern when a firm tracks individuals’ spending patterns, collects personal data, and targets them in ways to get them to buy things they otherwise did not want, at the highest price they are willing to pay. Alternatively, Congress could consider limiting customer data collection in the first place.

MERGER POLICY UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT

Antitrust laws generally are intended to prevent harmful accumulations of market power from forming in the first place. Under current merger policy, however, the burden is on enforcers to make the case that merging firms are likely to lessen competition (namely through higher prices), resulting in lax merger review and unchallenged large-scale acquisitions. Congress should adopt the following amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act to establish a tougher merger review process:

• Rather than placing the burden on the plaintiffs, the burden would shift to parties seeking to merge in ways that would either a) significantly increase concentration levels or b) be undertaken by firms that already hold significant market power—as demonstrated through the indices outlined above. The merging parties would have to prove that their proposed acquisition will not materially lessen competition, create a monopoly or monopsony, or help maintain their market power.

• Courts should be required to take all potential competitive outcomes of a merger into account, not just prices for consumers, including whether an acquisition will harm quality, choice, innovation, and privacy. That review must examine upstream effects on workers and suppliers and downstream effects on customers and others who could be harmed, and it must not assume that market power exercised upstream would result in “efficiencies” downstream or could be offset by them.

For proposed mergers that combine firms from different levels of the supply chain (i.e., manufacturer and distributor)—known as vertical mergers—Congress should prohibit such mergers when they could foster the firm’s ability and incentive to distort competition.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OR AMONG PARTIES UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Congress should update laws that govern agreements between or among parties under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, including restrictions on the behavior of two parties at different segments of a supply chain—known as vertical restraints—such as resale price maintenance, territorial and other non-price restraints, and non-compete clauses and other provisions restricting workers’ rights in labor contracts. This should include:

• Clarifying that federal antitrust law covers both inter- and intra-brand competition; that is, competition both within and between supplier-distributor networks, such as franchises;

• Specifying that price and non-price vertical restraints are illegal, including in the labor market, other than in narrow circumstances when no party to them possesses market power and the restraints are necessary to foster innovation and competition; and

• Further clarifying that attempts to engage unlawful conduct (such as collusion), in addition to the conduct itself, are prohibited.

CONCLUSION

To address today’s market power crisis, it is crucial that we restore and revitalize America’s antitrust system. While insufficient alone to deconcentrate power in the economy—we must also increase sectoral regulation, build countervailing power among a broad set of stakeholders, and establish a robust public sector capable of meeting society’s economic needs beyond the realm of profit and private advantage—the changes outlined above would substantially reverse rising concentration and establish principles by which economic power is truly democratized. With increasing concern across the political spectrum over today’s monopolies (or data-opolies), this is an opportune time. The aim is clear: Effective antitrust is vital to promote an economy that’s inclusive, to protect the privacy interests of citizens, to advance shared economic well-being, and to foster a healthy democracy. A new competition standard adds to a much-needed progressive blueprint for a robust 21st century antitrust regime.

#### That’s the core of the topic AND worth a whole season

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Judge Richard A. Posner famously described the consumer welfare standard as the “lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application of the antitrust laws” in 1986.1 In the decades since, the antitrust community readily embraced the “lodestar” denomination.2 The consumer welfare standard is indeed the focal point of modern antitrust analysis, guiding decisions and informing the rules and standards antitrust law imposes. But this is not the consumer welfare standard’s only function as lodestar. It is both guide and tether. It serves as the linchpin tying antitrust law to economic concepts and reasoning. Its guidance illuminates both what antitrust law is and—just as important, what it is not. The consumer welfare standard provides the basis for distinguishing between those concerns that antitrust law appropriately considers and those that it rightly omits. In doing so, the consumer welfare standard ensures a common language is spoken across antitrust matters today. Antitrust law did not always operate with a common language. For many decades following the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust lacked a unifying, consistent language. It was a cacophonous area of law, where decisions could be—and often were— premised upon vastly different reasoning from one to another, leading to numerous inconsistencies and internal tensions. This resulted in a general confusion as to how any given case would be decided. But more fundamentally, to questions regarding the very goals of antitrust law. The consumer welfare standard, with its economic underpinning, has come to represent a robust language defining antitrust discourse today. For the last several decades, courts and enforcers, economists and practitioners, and other experts have developed this language. The analysis today is far more comprehensive than it was when the courts first embraced the consumer welfare standard 40 years ago. Experts have continued to investigate and seek out theories of harm; to develop economic tools for empirically investigating conduct; and to analyze numerous other components factoring into antitrust analysis, such as potential efficiencies. Of late, the consumer welfare standard—and antitrust law more broadly—has come under renewed criticism. Criticisms come in various forms, but largely follow a similar thread, cataloguing its purported limitations: That it myopically focuses upon the short term and only upon price effects; that it omits consideration of important sociopolitical goals; that it is incapable of identifying and condemning problems endemic in the modern economy. While some of the criticisms ring true (the consumer welfare standard does not permit consideration of socio-political factors), others do not (the consumer welfare standard addresses far more than short term price effects). And many miss the mark because they overlook the history of how and why we arrived at the current understanding. Indeed, a common characteristic of the current criticism, often referred to as the Neo-Brandeisian movement, is that it bears remarkable resemblance to those populist movements that came before it. Today, antitrust critics make nearly the exact same arguments regarding the proper goals of antitrust law—any number of socio-political ends such as protecting small businesses and preventing “bigness”—that similar movements throughout the 20th century (and the late 19th century) espoused.3 Antitrust law did, in fact, embrace a more socio-political approach, which explicitly purported to serve just such values, for much of the 20th century.

#### B ⁠— changing the burden of proof, the rule of reason, which applies across the economy — per se changes that

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The key substantive provisions of the Sherman Act are Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. An agreement can be any “meeting of the minds” between separate entities. An agreement can be express or in the form of a tacit unwritten understanding.5 Most agreements are evaluated under the “rule of reason” standard. The rule of reason is a fact-based test that requires a plaintiff to prove that an agreement has harmed competition. To prove that an agreement has harmed competition, courts typically apply a three-step burden shifting framework. The plaintiff has the initial burden to show that the agreement imposed a meaningful restriction on competition in a relevant market. Agreements among parties that do not possess some degree of market power are unlikely to generate competitive harm, so market power plays an important role in step one of the test, either directly or indirectly. If the plaintiff shows competitive harm, the defendant must show a procompetitive rationale for the agreement. If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the same benefits could reasonably be achieved in a less restrictive manner.6 Where courts have determined that a particular type of agreement is unlikely to ever generate procompetitive benefits, that agreement is subject to the per se rather than rule of reason standard.7 If an agreement is per se unlawful, competitive harm is presumed and irrebuttable. Even parties that do not possess market power can violate Section 1 under the per se standard.8 Agreements in the per se category are primarily limited to agreements among competitors to fix prices, allocate territories, or engage in bid rigging. The DOJ has the discretion to prosecute these kinds of “hard core” violations criminally.9

### AT: Arbitrary/Predictability/Precision ⁠— 2NC

#### It’s the most common usage

Your Dictionary No Date, (YourDictionary, No Date, “Private-sector,” YourDictionary, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/private-sector>)

Private-sector meaning

The part of the economy that is controlled by individuals or private organizations and is not funded by the government.

noun

(business) All organizations in an economy or jurisdiction that are not controlled by government, including privately owned businesses and not-for-profit organizations.

*After spending two decades at various government agencies, he returned to the private sector and took a job as a business consultant.*

Of or pertaining to the private sector.

Adjective

#### US Code too!

US Code 96, (United States Code, 1-1-1996, “2 U.S. Code § 658 – Definitions, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/658#9>)

(9) Private sector

The term “private sector'” means all persons or entities in the United States, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, and educational and nonprofit institutions, but shall not include State, local, or tribal governments.

## Econ

#### China is looking to counter the US in the pharma industry by increasing innovation, pharma key to global heg

Atkinson 19 (Robert D. Atkinson is the founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) Atkinson, Robert D. China’s Biopharmaceutical Strategy: Challenge or Complement to U.S. Industry Competitiveness? Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 12 Aug. 2019. itif.org, <https://itif.org/publications/2019/08/12/chinas-biopharmaceutical-strategy-challenge-or-complement-us-industry>.

#### Retrenchment key to a concert strategy---that unlocks global governance.

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I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism.

Security and The Balance of Power

A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony.

Reviving Global Governance

A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance.

The implications for economic governance are profound: the United States would no longer exclude from consideration the notion of social democratic regulation of global capitalism and instead promote non-capitalist perspectives on the economy. Todd Tucker provides one great example of this approach when he argues that ISDS arbitration should include labor leaders and social justice advocates rather than international lawyers chosen by multinational firms which initiate legal action against sovereign states. It would also enable the United States to seriously consider Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax, Palley and Chow’s call for minimum wage floors, and a binding multilateral treaty that regulates global business activities on the basis of human rights. And finally, it would enable the drastic shift away from fossil fuels necessary to avoid climate apocalypse.

In Search of a Global Public

Naysayers might argue that all this degree of international cooperation sounds idealist, but all are possible in a context of declining great power competition. Once the United States recognizes the equal membership of all others in world politics on the basis of our extreme interdependencies, it can make possible what Mitzen has referred to as collective intentionality, or the emergence of a plural subject composed of several individuals who make and uphold joint commitments to each other and demand adherence as members of a global public. This kind of action is what the internationalist disposition can help us conceptualize, and even realize, through a concert strategy.

If progressive internationalists want to realize their objectives, they should be willing to turn away from the US establishment and embrace a concert strategy. By prioritizing cooperation on non-state issues and resolving great power competition through equal recognition, they can realize security for their own citizens as well as others. However, IR constructivists remind us that no foreign policy can be enacted by policymakers without a legitimating national security narrative. Progressive internationalists must continue to develop a new story about the United States that rationalizes a concert strategy and renders US national identity compatible with the pluralism we find in both world politics and US domestic politics. To develop this narrative, progressive internationalists should engage radical critiques of democracy, like those offered by Chantal Mouffe, which seek maximal inclusion of others and accept difference and conflict as irreducible elements of political life. A pluralist strategic narrative can thereby serve as the basis for mutual respect of others and enable the democratization of world politics.

#### Global governance checks emerging tech, pandemics, and war---extinction.

Bailey 18, Professional technologist and strategic manager. Robert earned his Master of Science Degree in Computer science in 2009, and has worked since then has a product engineer developing Microsoft stack technologies. (Robert, 9-5-201, "Why do we need global governance?" *Global Governance*, https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/)

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.

The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3

We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier.

There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4

Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways - we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves.

Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination.

Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

#### No Chinese hegemony.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, pg. 88-89)

The China Threat May Be Over-Hyped

First, and at the most basic level, it is not obvious that the China threat is as draconian as neo-primacy allows. To be sure, China is a more capable competitor than the United States has faced in many decades (and perhaps ever). Even compared to the Soviet Union, China enjoys a more dynamic economy, is better integrated into international institutions, has a larger and more homogenous population, and is geographically closer to the arena of major strategic contestation.51

That said, China is in a less advantageous position to do much with the capabilities at its disposal. On one level, Beijing does not enjoy the power vacuums along its periphery enjoyed by the Soviet Union during the heyday of the USSR’s post-war growth. It remains hemmed in by geography while potential balancers such as Japan, India, and Australia all retain significant latent capabilities that could be devoted to defense; many such counter-balancers have given strong signals of their inclination to oppose Chinese aggrandizement.52 These points also interact, giving a defensive advantage to many of the states along China’s periphery and underlining that a Chinese quest for regional hegemony or sphere of influence can be opposed by states positioned to help frustrate Chinese ambitions.

In essence, China is a threat, but it may not be the near-hegemon poised to ride roughshod over East Asia, cowing all local actors or carving off a sphere of influence, that neo-primacy assumes. By making more of the China threat than warranted, neo-primacy thereby risks creating a broader and deeper contest with Beijing than is warranted.

#### Countries turn inward---prefer post-COVID evidence.

Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.

This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.

Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.

I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.

Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible.

#### Empirics prove---downturn causes threat deflation.

Clary 15, PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ the U of Albany. (Christopher, 04/21/15, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department*, Research Paper No. 2015-8; pg. 4)

Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### Can’t solve warming ⁠— ignores regressions, outsourcing emissions, AND our ev assumes best-case scenarios

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Can Economies Grow as Carbon Emissions Fall?

All economic activity requires energy; to the extent, this energy comes from fossil fuels, the energy use results in emissions of CO2.8 This linkage implies that deep emissions reduction will constrain economic growth unless there is decoupling—meaning that drastic emission reductions are possible with little or no effect on growth. An instructive device for analyzing the linkage (or decoupling) of growth and CO2 emissions is the well-known Kaya identity (Kaya and Yokobori 1997), which decomposes global CO2 emissions (in million tonnes), denoted by C, into measurable “drivers” directly relevant to climate and energy policy: C=P×YP×CE×EY=P×y×c×e (1) where P = world population (billions of persons), Y = world GDP (in 2010 US$), E = total primary energy supply or TPES (in PJ), y = global per-capita income (in 2010 US$), c = C/E = carbon intensity of primary energy supply, or CO2 emissions per TPES, and e = E/Y = energy intensity of GDP. External factors influence the variables that make up the identity, and the variables interact with one another in various ways. Whatever the underlying causal mechanisms, the identity has to be satisfied ex-post. Carbon emissions rise, ceteris paribus when world population increases and/or when per-capita income rises. Emissions decline when energy intensity declines, for example, when higher energy prices cause firms to make energy efficiency investments that reduce the amount of energy needed to produce output. Carbon intensity declines when the share of renewable energy sources in electricity generation increases and the share of fossil-fuel energy goes down. In the growth-rate from the Kaya identity can be approximated by: Global carbon emissions growth is driven by population growth Pˆ, per-capita income growth yˆ, the growth of the carbon intensity of energy cˆ, and the growth of energy intensity of GDP eˆ. Table 1 shows the results of a decomposition of global CO2 emissions for the period 1971–2017 and our projection for the period 2017–2050, which satisfies Equation (2). We focus on CO2 emissions from the energy system which represent more than 70% of global GHG emissions in 2010.9 [Table 1 omitted] Let us first consider historical changes during 1971–2017 when global CO2 emissions increased by 1.88% yr−1. Growth in the population (at 1.52% yr−1) and in per capita real GDP (at 1.49% yr−1) exerted upward pressure on CO2 emissions, which was only partially offset by downward pressure from higher energy efficiency (energy intensity declined by 0.96% yr−1) and lower carbon intensity (which declined by 0.17% yr−1).10 These downward trends in energy and carbon intensity are still insufficient to delink economic growth and carbon emissions. Table 1 signals some improvement over time however, as energy intensity has begun to decline appreciably faster post-1990, recording a decline of 1.05% yr−1 during 1991–2017 as compared to 0.86% during 1971–1990. There is no similar sign of declining carbon intensity—the carbon intensity declined by 0.41% yr−1 during 1971–1990 but did not decline further during 1991–2017 Global average changes are the net outcomes of underlying regional changes. Table 2 shows the Kaya decomposition results for the OECD countries and the non-OECD countries, as well as separately for the U.S.A., the E.U.-28, China, India, and Indonesia, for the period 1971–2017. Country trajectories differ, but there are four general developments that are of critical importance to changes in emission trajectories. First, population growth has been lower during 1991-2017 compared to 1971-1990, leading to lower CO2 emissions growth; this declining trend will continue during the rest of this century. Second, all countries experienced negative energy intensity growth—in the OECD countries during 1991–2017, the improved energy efficiency more than offset the upward pressure on carbon emissions coming from per capita income growth. Third, the E.U.-28 and the U.S.A. exhibit negative carbon intensity growth, but somewhat worryingly, the rate of de-carbonization in the OECD has been slowing down during 1991–2017 compared to the years 1971–1990. The E.U. carbon intensity decline recorded during 1991–2017 is dominated by the growing share of (zero-carbon) renewables in total energy use, particularly due to Germany’s Energiewende (cf. Peters et al. 2017, 120). The non-OECD countries as a whole experienced somewhat lower carbon intensity growth during 1971–2017, as China, India, and Indonesia managed to substantially lower their (still high) carbon intensity growth rates. For instance, China brought down carbon intensity growth from 0.85% yr−1 during 1971–1990 to 0.27% yr−1 during 1991–2017, mostly because it reduced the share of fossil fuels in total energy use, and especially of coal (Grubb et al. 2015; Peters et al. 2017, 119; Guan et al. 2018). Finally, neither in the OECD nor in the non-OECD countries are the negative energy intensity growth and the declining carbon intensity growth large enough to ensure a decoupling of growth of CO2 emissions and growth of real GDP. The world as a whole has achieved only relative decoupling but no absolute decline in carbon emissions during 1971–1990 and 1991–2017. [Table 2 omitted] The greatest potential for drastic cuts in emissions lies in the deep de-carbonization of energy systems (Geels et al. 2017), which is exactly what emission scenarios consistent with COP21 indicate (Peters et al. 2017). The potential is largest in the non-OECD countries, where “low-hanging fruit” could be harvested by means of a rapid phasing out of coal, an equally rapid “phasing in” of renewable energies, enhancing the biosphere and carbon sinks, and the large-scale deployment of CCS. But most models cannot identify emission pathways consistent with the 66% “below 2 °C” goal without a large-scale ramp-up of CCS facilities (Peters et al. 2017, 121). It should be obvious that past and current trends in energy and carbon intensity are woefully inconsistent with future pathways that would stabilize the climate at temperature rises well below 2 °C—continuing with business-as-usual will irreversibly put the Earth System onto a “Hothouse Earth” pathway (Steffen et al. 2018). “The challenge that humanity faces,” write Steffen et al. (2018, 3), “is to create a “Stabilized Earth” pathway that steers the Earth System away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth.” The key issue is what the deep emissions reductions will mean for economic growth. Can we stabilize the climate system while growing the economy? A tentative growth projection for the period 2017–2050 is provided in the last two columns of Table 1. We use the transparent Kaya identity in growth rate form to explore the scope for economic growth in a climate-constrained world: yˆ=Cˆ−Pˆ−cˆ−eˆ (3) We assign values to the right side of Equation (3) to determine per-capita real income growth. First, we adopt the United Nation’s population projection (the “medium variant” from UN DESA 2015), which implies Pˆ = 0.79% yr−1 until 2050. Next, in line with the “2050 Low Carbon Economy Roadmap” adopted by the E.U., we assume that global CO2 emissions in 2050 will be 85% lower than in 1990; this implies an annual average reduction in global carbon emissions Cˆ by 6.92% yr−1. Our numbers refer to CO2 emissions caused by the combustion of fossil fuels in the energy sector. The latest IPCC target—net zero emissions by 2050—refers to all climate-relevant GHGs (IPCC 2018). CO2 emissions from land-use changes and the transport sector, as well as other GHG emissions, are probably harder to reduce or more expensive to reduce than energy-sector CO2 emissions; and it is doubtful that negative-emission technologies can be ramped up to the equivalent of 15% of the 1990 global emissions level. Therefore the 85% reduction target is a soft one (the IPCC target is stricter). Next, we borrow from the OECD (2017, Table 2.18) the projected decreases in energy intensity and carbon intensity: eˆ = −2.69% yr−1 and cˆ = −3.68% yr−1. These ambitious intensity reductions originally come from the IEA-IRENA 66% 2 °C scenario (IEA-IRENA 2017), which refers to the G20, and we assume they apply to the whole world. Based on the assumptions made, the climate-constrained growth rate of global real per-capita income is found to be negative (−1.34%yr−1) during the next three decades: yˆ=Cˆ−Pˆ−cˆ−eˆ=−6.92%−0.79%+3.68%+2.69%=−1.34% (4) Even with a relatively “soft” emission-reduction target, climate-constrained growth is not just well below the historical income growth rate (of 1.49%yr−1 during 1971–2017), but negative—which means there is a conflict between growing the world economy and keeping global warming from becoming dangerous and unstoppable. The sobering bottom line is this: taking the 85% reduction target as given, even under the techno-optimistic assumption that we manage to bring about historically unprecedented reductions in carbon intensity and energy intensity, the climate constraint is binding in the sense that future global economic growth would have to be not just significantly lower than historical growth, but even negative.11 An argument in favor of greater scope for economic growth has to rely on even more optimistic assumptions concerning technological progress—even more potent climate policies would have to be adopted to bring about even sharper reductions in carbon intensity and energy intensity. The growth implications of uncompromising climate policies are not obvious. Our plea is that we do whatever it takes to force through the technological, structural and societal changes needed to reduce carbon emissions so as to stabilize warming at 1.5 °C (Grubb 2014; Steffen et al. 2018) and just accept whatever consequences this has in terms of economic growth.

Is Obama Right about Decoupling?

The only way the world can meet the COP21 target is by a permanent absolute decoupling of growth and CO2 emissions (de Bruyn and Opschoor 1997; Ward et al. 2016). As shown in Tables 1 and 2 absolute decoupling over long periods remains elusive both in the OECD and non-OECD countries (as a whole). But what about recent individual country experiences: is there a group of leading high-income countries, including the U.S., that are growing their GDP while at the same time reducing their carbon emissions? Can we indeed put to rest the argument that halting warming requires accepting lower growth, as Obama argues? We systematically investigate the hypothesis that today’s high-income countries have crossed the turning point of the ubiquitous “inverted U-shaped” CKC (see Dinda 2004; Kaika and Zervas 2013a, 2013b; Stern 2017). The CKC hypothesis holds that CO2 emissions per person do initially increase with rising per capita income (due to industrialization), then peak and decline after a threshold level of per capita GDP, as countries arguably become more energy-efficient, more technologically sophisticated and more inclined to and able to reduce emissions by corresponding legislation and enforcement. The large empirical and methodological literature12 on the CKC does not provide unambiguous and robust evidence of a CKC peaking for carbon dioxide, if only because of well documented but yet unresolved econometric problems concerning the appropriateness of model specification and estimation strategies (e.g., Wagner 2008). We will leave these econometric issues aside however and instead focus on the fact that the majority of empirical CKC studies use territorial or PB emissions data to test the CKC hypothesis (Mir and Storm 2016)—and hence overlook the emissions embodied in international trade and in global commodity chains (Peters et al. 2011). Based on IPCC guidelines, GHG emissions are counted as the national emissions coming from domestic production. This geographical definition hides the GHG emissions embodied in international trade. Rich countries including the EU-27 and the United States. with high average consumption levels are known to be net carbon importers as the CO2 emissions embodied in their exports are lower than the emissions embodied in their imports (Nakano et al. 2009; Boitier 2012; Agrawala et al. 2013). Vice versa, most developing (and industrializing) countries are net carbon exporters. What this implies is that, because of cross-border carbon leakages, CB emissions are higher than PB emissions in the OECD countries but lower in the developing countries (Aichele and Felbermayr 2012). This indicates that while there may well be a Kuznets-like delinking between per-capita income and per-capita PB emissions, it is as yet unclear whether such delinking is also occurring in terms of CB emissions (e.g., Rosa and Dietz 2012; Knight and Schor 2014; Jorgenson 2014; Mir and Storm 2016).13 If not, the notion of “carbon decoupling” has to be rethought—in terms of a delinking between income and CB emissions. After all, it is no great achievement to reduce domestic per capita carbon emissions by outsourcing carbon-intensive activities to other countries and by being a net importer of GHG, while raising consumption and living standards (e.g., Rothman 1998; Bagliani, Bravo, and Dalmazzone 2008).

Estimating the Turning Points of Production-Based and Consumption-Based CKCs

Method

To evaluate the CKC hypothesis we run standard panel data regressions of per-capita CO2 emissions on per-capita income and per-capita income squared. The data and replication files are available as part of the supplementary materials on the article webpage. The population model includes country-specific effects and time-specific effects: lnco2=β0+β1⋅ln y+β2⋅(ln y)2+αt+ai+u (5) The dependent variable, co2, is either PB per-capita CO2 emissions or CB per-capita CO2 emissions. y is “real” per-capita GDP, and u is the unobserved disturbance term. t = 1, 2, …, T indexes time periods, and i = 1, 2, …, n indexes countries. αt is a time-specific effect, and ai is a country-specific effect (the population model, as written here, includes a regression constant, so ∑tαt=0 and ∑iai=0). The model restricts all countries to have a common turning point while allowing the level of emissions at the turning point to differ across countries. Turning points TP are calculated as TP=exp(−βˆ12βˆ2) (6) where the hat “∧” from now on denotes an estimate of the corresponding population parameter. The country-specific effect captures, for instance, a country’s endowment with fossil fuels. This interpretation immediately suggests that ai correlates with y; after all, a large resource endowment can be expected to increase a country’s income. The fixed-effect estimator (FE) addresses this endogeneity problem. The cross-country panel is short (large n, small T). The time-specific effects are estimated by the inclusion of dummy variables in the regressor vector. Equation (5) represents the “standard EKC regression model” (Stern 2017, 13), relating the log of per-capita emissions to the log of per-capita income. With the fixed-effects estimator, we are using the most common, tried, and tested estimation method. Alternative estimation methods including non-parametric ones tend to produce similar results (Stern 2017). The fixed-effects estimator exploits the variation over time to estimate the parameters of the model in Equation (5). Over a time period of one or two decades, the within-variation is relatively small compared to the variation across countries. Consequently, the standard errors will be relatively large. This is the price to pay for the ability to control for country-specific effects. Structural change means that the parameters of the model (5) will in general not be constant over time, but given our time horizon of one or two decades, there is no point in testing for structural breaks. When predicting the level of per-capita CO2 emissions for the average country, we use Duan’s smearing estimate to address the re-transformation bias (Duan 1983). Simply re-transforming the estimated conditional expectation would lead to underestimation of the per-capita emission level. We predict the per-capita emissions level at the mean of the estimated time-specific effects and the mean of the (implicitly) estimated country-specific effects: co2ˆ0=h⋅exp(βˆ0+βˆ1⋅ln y0+βˆ2⋅(ln y0)2+1T∑Tt=2aˆt) (7) where h=N−1∑i∑t exp(aˆi+uˆit) is the adjustment factor. aˆi+uˆit is the combined residual, the sum of the implicitly estimated country-specific effect and the idiosyncratic residual. Duan’s assumptions (homoscedasticity and i.i.d. data) are not satisfied here (heteroscedasticity and possible dependence across time), but it is better to make the adjustment than to knowingly underestimate the per-capita emission level.


Data

Our primary CO2 emissions data come from TECO2, the OECD’s Trade-in Embodied CO2 Database (OECD, 2019).14 The database, described in Wiebe and Yamano (2016), provides county-level estimates of CO2 emissions caused by the combustion of fossil fuels. This emissions concept excludes CO2 emissions from land-use change and forest fires, fugitive emissions, and emissions from industrial processes. The independent variable, co2, is defined as either PB emissions divided by population or CB emissions divided by population (kg CO2 per person). TECO2 covers 64 countries between 2005–2015. The GDP and population variables come from the Penn World Table (PWT) 9.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). The income variable, y, is defined as expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs in 2011 US$ (PWT variable code “rgdpe”) divided by population (“pop”). We simply write “dollars” or “dollars per person” to refer to this unit. We work with non-overlapping three-year averages to reduce measurement error and focus on structural relationships. We exclude small countries from our main estimation sample; more specifically, we exclude countries with a 1990–2015-average population below the first quartile in the PWT (fewer than 1.92 million people). The main estimation sample has N = 174 observations with n = 58 and T = 3. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the main sample (based on TECO2) and the other two samples. The mean per-capita income level in the main sample is $28,000, the minimum income is $2300 (Cambodia), and the maximum income is $75,000 (Singapore). The majority of countries in the main sample are high-income countries; income at the first quartile is $15,000. PB emissions range from 310 to 23,105 kg CO2 per person, and CB emissions range from 527 to 20,867 kg CO2 per person. The 58 countries account for 85% of global emissions in 2015 (both in terms of PB accounting and in terms of CB accounting). [Table 3 omitted]

Robustness

We adjust the baseline regressions in a number of ways to assess the robustness of the results. We include linear and quadratic time trends; we vary the observation frequency by switching from three-year non-overlapping averages to annual data; we include the small countries that are excluded from the main estimation sample; and finally, we use several sources for the CO2 emission data. This last robustness check is particularly important because the literature documents how country-level CB emission estimates vary with the underlying input-output table (Wiedmann et al. 2011; Moran and Wood 2014; Rodrigues et al. 2018; Wieland et al. 2018). Therefore, we source alternative CO2 emission data from Eora15 and the OECD-ICIO-201516. Both databases provide country-level estimates of PC and CB CO2 emissions caused by the combustion of fossil fuels. Eora (Lenzen et al. 2013) covers 190 countries between 1990 and 2015. The OECD-ICIO-2015 (OECD 2015) covers 61 countries between 1995 and 2011.

Regression Results

Figure 1 plots CKCs for the “average country” and “average time period,” that is, it shows predicted emissions at varying income levels at the mean of the country-specific effects and the mean of the time-specific effects (the country-specific effects and the time-specific effects shift the intercept, moving the curves up or down). The curves in the upper panel are derived from regressions based on the main estimation sample. The regressions provide no evidence for the existence of a CKC, neither for PB emissions nor for CB emissions. Over the sample range, emissions monotonically increase with income. There is no turning point. Figure 1. The Carbon-Kuznets-Curve. Note: Based on calculations by the authors as described in the Method section. For the underlying fixed-effect estimations results, see Table 4, column 1, and Table 5, column 1. The CKCs are drawn as solid lines inside the range of observed per-capita incomes and as dotted lines outside the sample range (dotted when higher than the sample maximum or lower than the sample minimum).  The claim that eventually emissions will fall as income grows—there are turning points, but they are outside the sample range—would require a willingness to extrapolate the statistical relationship beyond the extreme values in the sample to an unobserved domain. The data determines the shape of the curve in the sample range, but it cannot tell us whether the population parameters and the functional form are stable at unobserved income levels. The statistical analysis of historical data cannot justify extrapolation. The fixed-effect regression that underpins Figure 1 is summarized in Table 4. Columns 1 and 4 report results from the baseline specification that includes time period dummies in the regressor vector. A Wald test for the joint significance of the time period dummies suggests that they should be included in the regression model (it rejects the null that the coefficients on the time period dummies are jointly zero). The signs of the regression coefficients are consistent with the existence of a CKC, but their magnitude implies turning points far outside the estimation sample range. In the case of CB emissions, the coefficient on the log of income squared is not statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting a linear positive relationship between emissions and income.17 Replacing the time period dummies with a linear time trend (columns 2 and 5) or with a quadratic time trend (columns 3 and 6) changes little: coefficient signs, magnitudes, and their statistical significance are essentially the same as in the specification with time period dummies. [Table 4 omitted] A different source for emissions data gives different results. We postulate the same statistical model and use the same estimation method but switch the emissions data source. The use of the OECD-ICIO-2015 database leads to the CKCs shown in the lower panel of Figure 1—now the turning points fall inside the estimation sample range. The turning point for PB emissions is at $39,000–$41,000 and the turning point for CB emissions is at nearly twice that level at $71,000–$78,000, near the estimation sample’s maximum. The underlying regressions are summarized in Table 5. In general, the OECD-ICIO-2015 yields more precise coefficient estimates (in the sense that the t ratios are higher than in the baseline regressions) because it covers a longer stretch of time and the fixed-effects estimator relies on time variation. The table reports six regressions that all support the existence of a CKC: the coefficients have the “right” signs and magnitudes and are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. [Table 5 omitted] The appendix presents the results of several robustness tests. Table 6 replicates the analysis from Table 4 and 5, this time using Eora as the source for emissions data. The Eora sample contains more developing countries than the other two samples, which introduces additional variation in the dependent variable. The income variables and time dummies capture only a small fraction of this variation. The coefficients have the “right” signs, but are not statistically significant, even after excluding potential outliers (quantitative outlier tests could support the exclusion of observations from Belarus, Moldova, and Ethiopia). The lack of statistical significance stems in part from the high correlation between the log of income and the log of income squared. When either variable is included alone, its regression coefficient becomes statistically significant and indicates a positive relationship between income and emissions (regressions not reported). Table 7 adds six small countries that were excluded from the main estimation sample, meaning it uses data for all 64 countries covered by TECO2. The results are basically the same as in Table 4 and need no further commenting. Table 8 moves from the three-year non-overlapping averages to annual observations. Exploiting the high-frequency variation does improve the precision of the coefficient estimates, and the coefficient on the log of income squared turns up statistically significant. Changes to the size of the coefficients are minor. Overall TECO2 suggests that emissions monotonically increase with income, for the database produces no evidence of turning points inside the sample range, neither for PB emissions nor for CB emissions. [Tables 6-8 omitted] In the case of CB emissions, the regression coefficients vary with the source data (compare the columns 4–6 in Table 4 and Table 5). In the case of PB emissions, the coefficients hardly change. Yet even small changes in the coefficients generate large changes in the turning points (e.g., compare the columns 1–3 and 4–6 in Table 5) because the turning points are calculated as an exponential function of the ratio of the regression coefficients. Given this non-linearity, an innocuous switch of the source for emissions data has dramatic implications for the turning points. Therefore, the exact quantitative implications of the CKC analysis are to be interpreted with caution. Robust quantitative interpretations would presume a level of precision that no statistical analysis can deliver. The implied turning points, whether inside the sample range or outside, are higher for CB emissions than for PB emissions—this qualitative finding is robust and holds across all specifications.

Summing Up

Our econometric analysis yields three conclusions. First, the evidence in support of a CKC pattern for PB emissions is fragile at best. Only the OECD-ICIO-2015 database generates the inverted-U-shaped pattern. In any case, global economic development along the CKCs would not be compatible with the IPCC (2018) pathway consistent with keeping global warming below 1.5 °C. If China developed along the path of the production-based CKC, it would exhaust a third of the global carbon budget before even reaching the turning point.18 The production-based inverted U-shaped CKC is, in other words, not a relevant framework for climate change mitigation. Second, our results suggest that economic growth has not decoupled from CB emissions.19 Some of the OECD countries have managed to some extent to delink their production systems from CO2 emissions by relocating and outsourcing carbon-intensive production activities to the low-income countries. The generally used production-based GHG emissions data ignore the highly fragmented nature of global production chains (and networks) and are unable to reveal the ultimate driver of increasing CO2 emissions: consumption growth (Rosa and Dietz 2012; Knight and Schor 2014; Mir and Storm 2016). Corroborating evidence is provided by Jorgenson (2014) who finds that in North America, Europe, and Oceania, increases in human well-being (measured as life expectancy) are associated with a rising carbon intensity of well-being. Third, and most importantly, what the statistical analysis shows is that to avoid environmental catastrophe, the future must be different from the past. However, the dominant “green growth” approaches remain squarely within the realm of “business-as-usual” economics, proposing solutions which rely on technological fixes on the supply side and voluntary or “nudged” behavior change on the demand side, and which are bound to extend current unsustainable production, consumption and emission patterns into the future. The belief that any of this half-hearted tinkering will lead to drastic cuts in CO2 emissions in the future is altogether too reminiscent of Saint Augustine’s “Oh Lord, make me pure, but not yet.” If past performance is relevant for future outcomes, our results should put to bed the complacency concerning the possibility of “green growth.” We have to stop the self-deception.

#### No diversionary war---rhetoric solves.

* Evidence on diversionary war is mixed at best
* They use hostile rhetoric instead of war to have their cake and eat it too – achieves same benefits without conflict
* Prefer our study because it’s based on 50,000 US diplomatic events classified by interstate interactions across economic crises

Carter 18, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California. (Erin Baggott, 08/29/18, “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Unemployment and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010”, www.erinbcarter.org/documents/diversionUS.pdf]

There is a large literature on diversionary conflict in international relations, but it focuses on material conflicts like militarized interstate disputes rather than foreign policy rhetoric. It is based in social identity theory, which suggests that leaders can increase ingroup affinity by making intergroup distinctions more salient (Closer, 1950; Simmel, 1955; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary conflict is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed” (Baum and Potte r, 2008, 48). Several studies find evidence of diversionary aggression in US foreign policy (Clark, 2003; DeRouen, 2000; DeRouen and Peake, 2002; Fordham, 1998a, 6; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; James and Hristoulas, 1994; James and Oneal, 1991; Levy, 1989«,fc; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986) and elsewhere (Bennett, 2000; Dassel and Reinhardt, 1000; Davies, 2002; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000; Gelpi, 1997; Heldt, 1999; Lebow, 1981; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Tir, 2006; Russett, 1990; Sobek, 2007; Tir, 2010). Yet skeptics have amassed opposing evidence (Chiozza and Gormans, 2003, 2004; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Gowa, 1998; Johnston, 1998; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik, 2000, 2004; Meeraik and Waterman, 1996; Moore and Lanoue, 2003; Potter, 2007). Some cases are hard to reconcile with the theory: in Britain, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, and Kosovo wars (Lai and Reiter, 2005). Some go so far as to call diversionary aggression a “myth” (Meernik and Waterman, 1996).

Others have developed scope conditions for diversionary aggression. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), when leaders are accountable (Carter, 2018; Kisangani and Pickering, 2011), and in mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). It is less likely when states avoid provoking troubled adversaries (Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2005; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Miller, 1999). Diversion appears more likely to produce a rally when supported by Security Council authorization (Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004), when the White House draws attention to a dispute (Baker and Oneal, 2001), and in conditions of media attention, popular leadership, divided government, non election years, and first terms (Colaresi, 2007). Most recently, scholars have asked whether diversion occurs outside democracies. They find some autocracies, especially single party regimes, divert as well (Carter, 2018; Pickering and Kisangani, 2011).

This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric. There is surprisingly little research on rhetoric in international relations. The international relations literature deems talk “cheap” (Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005). The audience cost literature considers rhetoric meaningful, but only if it invokes audience costs through explicit, public threats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007). However, if foreign policy rhetoric can activate ingroup identity, then it may be appealing for leaders who wish to improve their ratings without incurring the substantial risks of militarized interstate disputes. While it might be “outlandish” for presidents to engage in the impeachable exercise of diversionary war (Meernik and Waterman, 1996), hostile foreign policy rhetoric is far less outlandish a risk.

To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk, this paper draws upon research in political psychology and political communication. These literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs (Behr and Iyengar, 19s."); Bennett. Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Brody, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Jentleson, 1992; Zaller and Chiu, 2000). I draw on social identity theory to argue that diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences between nations and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably. When a leader criticizes foreigners, she cues ingroup identity, which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to herself as its leader. This is a “solidarity mechanism,” through which “[c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted, norms of group-based altruism are strengthened, punishment and rejection of defectors are increased, and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated” (Halevy, Bernstein and Sagiv, 2008, 405).

The theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target. I follow the consensus in the diversionary conflict literature in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval for leaders. Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda. Therefore, when the economy deteriorates, leaders will criticize foreign nations to improve their approval ratings and restore the political capital necessary for them to govern. Second, a key observation from social identity theory is that the depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment. Therefore, consonant with recent empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), I expect diversionary rhetoric to be most effective when it targets threatening outgroups. In the context of foreign policy, these are best represented by historical adversaries. And finally, because diversionary cheap talk shifts the focus of political competition from the partisan to the international level, it has differential partisan effects. Because national identity cues widen the tent of the political ingroup, diversionary cheap talk is most effective at boosting support among the leader’s nonpartisans: liberal citizens for conservative leaders, and conservative citizens for liberal leaders.

I test these hypotheses with the American Diplomatic Dataset, an original record of over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 drawn from New York Times articles on foreign affairs. I used tools from computational social science to classify bilateral interstate interactions into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories: verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material cooperation, and material conflict. This is by far the most historically extensive event dataset. As such, it allows an exploration of US foreign policy behavior across a variety of administrations and economic crises.

I find robust evidence of diversionary cheap talk in US foreign policy. First, I establish that US presidents face incentives to divert verbally rather than materially: while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings, critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings, especially among nonpartisans. Responding to this incentive, presidents between 1945 and 2010 typically diverted in the form of words, not deeds. Simulations indicate that as unemployment varied from its minimum to its maximum observed value, hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled, depending on the administration. Throughout this study, estimates are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States initiated, although findings are robust to a redefinition of conflict as events the United States participated in. The verbal statements in the dataset are high profile and likely to be noticed by the American public: all appeared in the headlines of the New York Times.

This study contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, it demonstrates that US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions. International relations scholars should therefore continue to focus more seriously on the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and in particular its relationship to domestic politics (Johnston, 2001, 2008; Kurizaki, 2007; Ramsay, 2011; Sartori, 2002, 2005; Trager, 2010, 2011, 201(i). The American Diplomacy Dataset will enable researchers to further explore the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and their relationships to material and economic factors, in more detail than existing datasets permit.

Second, this study contributes to the diversionary conflict literature by showing that in many cases where diversionary theory predicts conflict initiation, leaders instead choose rhetorical hostility. In this sense, leaders may have their cake and eat it too: They benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting an international crisis. The mixed empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature may be partly due to the fact that existing scholarship considers only the most serious forms of diversion like militarized interstate disputes. It is possible that a wide range of diversionary behavior takes place at less extreme levels, such as the rhetorical hostility documented in this paper.1

**\*\*\*BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***

In the language of the foreign policy substitutability literature (Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom and Reed, 2008; Most and Starr, 1984, 1989; Oakes, 2012), rhetorical hostility, like the development of new economic policies, may be seen as a substitute for diversionary conflict.

**\*\*\*END FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***

#### Even if, no escalation; leaders pick easy targets.

Clary 15, PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ the U of Albany. (Christopher, 04/21/15, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department*, Research Paper No. 2015-8; pg. 19)

Setting aside the overall levels of empirical support, there is at least one other way to reconcile diversionary war with patterns of diversionary peace. It is possible that if diversionary war does occur it is less likely to occur between rivals. While rivalries have emotional salience because of the enduring conflict, they also involve states that have been unable to resolve the rivalry through military force, as evidenced by the rivalry’s continued existence. A war that a leader expects to lose is unlikely to be an attractive diversion from domestic woes.52 As Amy Oakes notes, many weak states are seeking at most a “diversionary spectacle,” by provoking controversy with a target “unlikely to fight back.”53 The median dyad in the international system is 71 percent more unequal in its distribution of capabilities than the median rival pair.54 Rivals, on average, are less attractive targets for opportunism than other states.

## Innovation

### 2NC---!D---ABR

#### No antibiotic apocalypse---it’s slow and research solves.

Cox 17, Lecturer in Microbiology, Aston University. PhD, Molecular Microbiology and Drug Discovery. (Jonathan, 3-21-2017, "It’s the age of the antibiotic revolution, not apocalypse", *Conversation*, https://theconversation.com/its-the-age-of-the-antibiotic-revolution-not-apocalypse-73476)

Bad news sells papers. Or as Elliot Carver, the media mogul set on world domination in the Bond film Tomorrow Never Dies put it: “There’s no news like bad news.” As a scientist, my responsibility is to separate fact from fiction, to follow evidence, not instinct. So when I read doomsday reports of a coming “antibiotic apocalypse”, I question their legitimacy. Are we really all standing on the edge of the medical precipice, about to tumble into an oblivion of death-by-superbug? We most certainly are not. The end of the world may well be on the horizon, but it surely won’t be due to antibiotic resistance. In order to understand why, you need to understand resistance: where it comes from, what it can do, and crucially, what scientists are doing about it. Predominantly, antibiotic resistance is a man-made problem. Since the discovery of penicillin in 1928, we have consistently provided the opportunity for resistance to evolve, persist and spread through the mismanagement and incorrect administration of antibiotics. We have also learned major lessons in the last decade as to where antibiotic resistance comes from and what measures we can take to control it. Some of these, such as the C-reactive protein (CRP) test – which can help detect if patients actually need antibiotic drugs or not – are proving to be highly effective, while others haven’t been and have occasionally even exacerbated the problem. Sensitivity testing before use The point is, scientists all over the world are working tirelessly to think up new and innovative solutions to the problem. Despite their best efforts, and a growing understanding of antibiotic resistance, we still sometimes get it wrong. A woman in the US recently died of an infection so incredibly resistant that “there were no antibiotics left” to treat her. Some hysterical headlines described the deadly bacteria as a “superbug resistant to all available antibiotics”, because 26 different types failed to work. But was her infection resistant to all of these before she was given the very first antibiotic? The answer is undoubtedly, no. Fundamentally, bacteria are given an opportunity to develop resistance. Sensitivity testing allows infections to be tested against different antibiotics in a lab to see if they will be effective. While this was carried out on the woman’s infection, it was already too late – somewhere along the line, she’d had too much exposure to inappropriately used antibiotics and the infection had become resistant. Sensitivity testing at the start of an infection should be standard practice. The first questions doctors should be asking are “What antibiotics will actually work against this?” and “What am I up against?” so that any prescription will be effective in the first instance. More progressive hospitals with microbiology labs are beginning to do this as a matter of course to better control and manage antibiotic resistance. There isn’t always time, for example with sepsis, which moves very fast, but for chest, skin, and urinary tract infections the results can be available within 24 hours. Treatment is then based on fact rather than a guess. If you get it wrong enough times, you get resistance. Failing to test for bacterial sensitivity early on in the infection, waiting instead until it is known that the infection is resistant, makes the scenario much worse. Claims that the use of colistin, a “last hope” antibiotic, is soaring in English hospitals is true. But this is driven by a failure to test for antibiotic sensitivity before it is too late, leading to a need to turn to colistin. Clinicians often assume everyone’s urinary, respiratory or other infection is the same, and will respond in the same way to tried and tested antibiotics. Scientifically speaking, everyone’s infection is different and should be treated as such. No apocalypse in sight Sad as the death of the woman in the US is, it is not uncommon for a death to result from resistance. Reports suggest that around 700,000 people die from antibiotic resistant infections globally each year, the majority in underdeveloped countries with poor access to healthcare. This number is predicted to rise to 10m deaths a year by 2050 if nothing is done about the problem. But “apocalypse” is the wrong word for this. The global population has doubled since World War II, when around 10m people a year died. Humankind certainly won’t be wiped out. Even if we were to face the worst case scenario by 2050, antibiotic resistance would affect about 1% of people on the planet. And that is assuming we sit back and do nothing. In fact, 1,618 scientific research papers were published on antibiotic resistance in 2015. There is lots of funding into resistance and scientists are doing lots to tackle the problem. Schemes such as the Longitude Prize – a prize for scientists that has currently set a challenge for creating a cost-effective, accurate, rapid and easy-to-use test for bacterial infections – are pushing the momentum of discovery in this area.

#### ABR won’t get close to extinction, and intervening actors solve it.

Cara 17, science writer for The Atlantic, Newsweek, and Vocativ. (Ed, 1-27-2017, “The Attack Of The Superbugs”, http://www.vocativ.com/394419/attack-of-the-superbugs/)

Antibiotic-resistant infections kill at least 700,000 people worldwide a year right now, according to an exhaustive report commissioned by the UK in 2014, and without any substantial medical breakthroughs or policy changes that slow down resistance, they may claim some 10 million deaths annually by 2050 — eclipsing cancer in general as a leading cause. These deaths largely won’t come from pan-resistant infections, just tougher ones. A preventable death there, a preventable death here. Leaving that aside, antibiotics, along with proper sanitation and nutrition, gird our entire way of living. Most every invasive surgery, pregnancy, organ transplant and chemotherapy session we go through will become riskier. Other diseases like HIV, malaria or influenza will become deadlier, since bacteria often exploit the opening in our immune system they leave behind. And already precarious populations like those living with cystic fibrosis, prisoners, and the poor will lose years off their lives. For all the warranted gloom, though, Farewell does think there are reasons to be hopeful. “I don’t think we are doing enough, but the scientific community along with many governmental and private foundations are very actively involved in finding not only new antibiotics, but new solutions to this problem,” she said. There’s been a noticeable change in attitude and increased urgency surrounding antibiotic resistance, she said, one that she hadn’t seen even five years ago, let alone twenty. Until recently, that attitude change could be seen from places as high up as the U.S. federal government. In 2014, former President Obama issued an executive order aimed at addressing antibiotic resistance, the first real acknowledgement of the problem from an administration, devoting funding and outlining a national action for combatting resistance. Through its federal agencies, the administration pushed to reduce antibiotic use on farms and encouraged doctors to stop using them in excess. “There has been a lot of work done the last couple of years, much of it spurned by [Obama’s] National Action Plan,” said Dr. David Hyun, a senior officer for Pew Charitable Trusts’ Antibiotic Resistance Project. The CDC, in particular, has used its funding to open up regional labs that allow them to better detect and respond to antibiotic-resistant outbreaks like the Nevada case, he said. They ultimately hope to create an expansive surveillance system that can easily keep track of resistance rates on a national, state and regional level. A parallel system also exists for monitoring resistance in the food chain, shepherded by the CDC and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In fact, it was this sort of cooperation between national and local health agencies that enabled Nevada doctors to stop the worst from happening, said Dr. Lei Chen. The swift identification of a possible CRE strain by the hospital, coupled with the woman’s medical history, led to a precautionary quarantine, while also prompting Chen’s public health department and eventually the CDC into action. And it may help prevent future cases from spilling into the public. According to Chen, the CDC has allocated funding this year to all of Nevada’s state public health departments so they can better detect CRE and other dangerous resistant strains. Under the Trump administration, there’s no telling how these small victories will hold up or whether they will advance. All references to antibiotics once found on the Whitehouse.gov site have been removed, including a link to the Obama administration’s national action plan, and the fact that they’re already tried to bar USDA scientists from discussing their work with the public while stripping funding from other public health agencies isn’t encouraging. Even with the best public policy, however, there’s no clear light at the end of the tunnel. Antibiotic resistance has gradually been worsening, even within the last 15 to 20 years, when superbugs like methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) first became widely known, said Hyun. The effort needed to develop new drugs has been in short supply, hamstrung by pharmaceutical companies’ inability to recoup the costs of bringing new antibiotics to market. That’s because, unlike the latest heart medication, any new antibiotics will have to be treated like the last drops of water during a drought, used as little as possible — the exact opposite way to make money off a new product. Yet, much like climate change, the financial toll of not doing anything will total in the trillions years down the road. And it already numbers in the billions now, according to the CDC. Of course, we need bacteria to survive. And most need or pay no mind to us in return. Even pan-resistant bacteria don’t really mean harm. Some have been found in perfectly healthy people, a fact that’ll either comfort you or keep you awake at night, only causing problems when our immune system wavers. There’s no army of sentient E. coli that will rise up and someday overthrow the human race. But barring the calvary showing up, a new fear of ours will learn to settle in, almost unnoticed. It’ll creep in when we pick our heads up from a nasty fall that scrapes our skin open or breaks our bones; when we wave goodbye to our loved ones before they enter an operating room, or when we cradle our newborns into a world teeming with the living infinitesimal, wishing there was still a way to shield them from it as our parents once could for us. A fear of naked vulnerability. The antibiotic apocalypse will be gentle, if it fully arrives, but it won’t be any less devastating to the human spirit.

### 2NC---!D---Disease

#### Resiliency, intervening actors, burnout

Adalja 16, infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh (Amesh, 6-17-2016, "Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?," *The Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/)

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.

While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.

#### Burnout and variation check

York 14 (Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch of the Influenza Division at the CDC, PhD in Molecular Virology and Immunology from McMaster University, M.Sc. in Veterinary Microbiology and Immunology from the University of Guelph, former Assistant Prof of Microbiology & Molecular Genetics at Michigan State, “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4/2014, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species)

But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way.¶ Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive.¶ We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. ¶ We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

# 1NR

## CP

### 1NR---CP

#### Solves the innovation advantage every internal link by providing funding for drugs.

### 1NR---AT: Condo

## T

### 1NR---T

### 1NR---T---AT: We Meet

#### Settlements are dispute resolutions

LII No Date, (Legal Information Institute, No Date, "Settlement," LII / Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/settlement)

Settlement

Primary tabs

1. An agreement that ends a dispute and results in the voluntary dismissal of any related litigation. Regardless of the exact terms, parties often choose to keep their settlement agreements private.

2. In business law, the payment, satisfaction, and closing of an account.

3. In wills and estates, the complete execution of an estate by the executor.

4. In wills and estates, the conveyance of property interests to beneficiaries in a way that alters what they would receive as heirs under statutes of descent and distribution.

#### Solvency advocate is about patent protections

1AC Carrier 14 [Blue] (Michael A. Carrier is a leading authority in antitrust and intellectual property law with expertise in the pharmaceutical, high-technology, and music industries. He is a highly sought-after media expert and has frequently been cited by courts. He is a co-author of the leading IP/antitrust treatise and the author of more than 120 articles and book chapters., 30 Dec 2014, accessed on 6-26-2021, Iowa Law Review, "Payment After Actavis", https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/ILR-100-1-Carrier.pdf)

In its landmark Actavis decision, the Supreme Court ensured that antitrust courts would carefully scrutinize drug patent settlements for years to come. One of the most pressing issues is the type of payment that triggers antitrust scrutiny. This Article introduces a framework that can guide courts in addressing this question. If the settling parties are able to show that the payment is no larger than future litigation costs, the settlement can be justified. In addition, if the parties can show that the payment is actually for unrelated generic services rather than delay, the settlement also can be justified. But courts must employ a heavy dose of common sense when scrutinizing this type of compensation. Brands and generics almost never enter into side deals outside the settlement context. And brands tend not to need generic assistance in promoting their products or providing manufacturing services. But if the parties nonetheless are able to show that the payment really is for the generic services, then courts should find a justification. If the parties cannot offer one of these two justifications, the test then focuses on whether the generic delays entering the market after the brand conveys a type of consideration that would not have been available as a direct consequence of showing that the patent was invalid or not infringed. Most settlements today do not take the quaint and simple form of the brand paying cash to the generic. But to the extent they do, such a payment (exceeding litigation costs) to a generic that has not entered the market offers a type of consideration that would not be available through a district court victory. The same conclusion holds for poison-pill clauses and no-authorized-generic provisions, neither of which is a possible result from a ruling that a patent is invalid or not infringed. The exclusion of the generic in these cases thus comes from the transfer of consideration rather than the patent, and is an exclusion payment that violates the antitrust laws. In contrast, a brand’s forgiveness of accrued damages against a generic that has already entered the market calls for more nuanced antitrust analysis since it falls within the range of potential expected litigation outcomes. With each passing day, brands and generics are settling patent litigation by entering into an array of increasingly complex business arrangements. Any test to ascertain the antitrust liability of such agreements must recognize that all settlements provide something of value to the settling parties. It also must effectuate the Actavis Court’s instruction to avoid an examination of the patent merits—which the settling parties will forcefully demand—in the vast majority of cases. The Supreme Court in Actavis was clear in its concern that large and unjustified payments had the potential for “significant adverse effects on competition”246 and were likely to violate the antitrust laws. The test introduced in this Article makes sense of this standard. If a generic delays entry after the brand conveys a type of consideration not available as a consequence of winning the lawsuit, the exclusion cannot be justified by the patent but must result from the payment. Courts need not analyze whether the patent is valid and infringed because the brand would not be able to provide such consideration even if a court were to find that the patent was valid and infringed. In short, the test offers a simple and effective framework that courts can use to determine when a conveyance from a brand to a generic violates the antitrust laws.

#### Next card is about pricing concerns

Daniel 1AC Burke 18 [Kansas]. Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. “An Examination of Product Hopping by Brand-Name Prescription Drug Manufacturers: The Problem and a Proposed Solution” Cleveland State Law Review. Volume 66; Issue 2; Article 8. 04-01-18. <https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3995&context=clevstlrev>

Specifically, courts should consider, as a third prong to the analysis of potentially monopolistic conduct, whether the relevant market under review is typical or is one that has unique competitive (i.e., pricing) concerns lending that market to a more skeptical judicial inquiry. In effect, this new prong would be a sub-issue of the first prong of the analysis concerning whether the market actor in question has market monopoly power.193 Courts have stated that monopoly power exists in a market when one product comprises two-thirds of the relevant market,194 ninety percent of the relevant market,195 and eighty-seven percent of the relevant market.196 A presentation detailing company performance from 2013 indicated that Mayne Pharma Group, Ltd. (Warner Chilcott’s partner in the production and distribution of Doryx) reported a sixty percent market share for Doryx.197 This substantial control of the market that treats severe acne puts the drug’s manufacturer in position to continue to drive up prices and harm consumers. The prescription drug market is not like other markets. Pharmaceutical companies invest tremendous sums of money into research and development.198 This investment is superseded, however, by investment in marketing the fruits of research and development’s labors.199 For example, Johnson & Johnson spent twice as much on marketing than it did on research and development in 2013 ($17.5 billion and $8.2 billion, respectively).200 The even more interesting part of this breakdown is determining the target of that marketing. In 2012, pharmaceutical companies spent $24 billion marketing toward physicians as compared to a relatively modest $3 billion marketing toward consumers.201 This discrepancy highlights a point previously made and articulated in the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Amicus Brief in support of Mylan: “the consumer who pays does not choose, and the physician who chooses does not pay.”202 Physicians, through no fault of their own, are the ones who limit consumers’ market by the very nature of the system of prescriptions. If courts refuse to accept the characteristics of the pharmaceutical market as being unique, and thus requiring bespoke analysis, rising prescription drug prices will continue to harm those same consumers who are powerless to affect change. The FTC’s amicus brief filed after the Mylan decision urged the court to understand the differences in the pharmaceutical market. The FTC specifically argued that, given market differences, consumers will be harmed if this practice is permitted to continue.203 The brief stressed that automatic substitution laws are “vital means to a successful competition since [they are] aimed to address the ‘disconnect between prescribing physicians and payors.’”204 Drug substitution laws, discussed supra, allow pharmacists to substitute cheaper, bioequivalent drugs for patients.205 This lowers costs and allows true competition from actors other than brand-name prescription drug manufacturers.206 The FTC’s concern that consumers would be harmed absent these laws is warranted and should be heeded by courts when addressing this issue.

### 1NR---AT: C/I

### 1NR---!---Ground

### 1NR---!---Limits

### AT: Aff Ground

#### 3---Overlimiting is structurally impossible---the field of antitrust law is enormous

Spencer Weber Waller 20, John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Professor, and Director of Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law, and Jacob E. Morse, J.D. Candidate at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law, “The Political Face of Antitrust”, Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial, and Commercial Law, Volume 15, July 2020, https://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/\_11\_weber\_waller\_v21\_formatted\_1\_.pdf?68864/b1fc17637de92baef13f2a93eb750f872a721091

IV. Antitrust in Civil Society Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time,117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review,123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019.125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute,130 American Antitrust Institute,131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos,136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted.

### 1NR---AT: Topic Education

### 1NR---AT: Functional Limits

### 1NR---AT: No Ground Loss

### 1NR---AT: Reasonability

# 2NR

#### Definition

Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemony

Hegemony (/hɪˈdʒɛməni/ (audio speaker iconlisten), UK also /hɪˈɡɛməni/, US also /ˈhɛdʒəmoʊni/) is the political, economic, and military predominance of one state over other states.[1][2] In Ancient Greece (8th c. BC – AD 6th c.), hegemony denoted the politico-military dominance of the hegemon city-state over other city-states.[3] In the 19th century, hegemony denoted the "social or cultural predominance or ascendancy; predominance by one group within a society or milieu" and "a group or regime which exerts undue influence within a society".[4]

#### Here is your author---saying slow growth wrecks heg

1AC Haas 17—(President of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan). Richard Haas. A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. 1-10-17. Penguin Press)

A large portion of the burden of creating and maintaining order at the regional or global level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable for several reasons, only one of which is that the United States is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come. The corollary to this point is that no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically; there is no invisible hand in the geopolitical marketplace. Again, a large part of the burden (or, more positively, opportunity) falls on the principal power of the day. There is more than a little self-interest at stake. The United States cannot remain aloof, much less unaffected by a world in disarray. Globalization is more reality than choice. At the regional level, the United States actually faces the opposite problem, namely, that certain actors do have the mind-set and means to shape an order. The problem is that their views of order are in part or in whole incompatible with U.S. interests. Examples would include Iran and ISIS in the Middle East, China in Asia, and Russia in Europe. It will not be an easy time for the United States. The sheer number and range of challenges is daunting. There are a large number of actors and forces to contend with. Alliances, normally created in opposition to some country or countries, may not be as useful a vehicle in a world in which not all foes are always foes and not all friends are always friendly. Diplomacy will count for a great deal; there will be a premium on dexterity. Consultations that aim to affect the actions of other governments and their leaders are likely to matter more than negotiations that aim to solve problems. Another reality is that the United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges. The United States could reduce its carbon footprint dramatically, but the effect on global climate would be modest if India and China failed to follow suit. Similarly, on its own the United States cannot maintain a world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease. Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy. Earlier I made the case that it represents realism for an era of globalization. It also is a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War. There are basic differences, however. Containment was about holding back more than bringing in and was designed for an era when rivals were almost always adversaries and in which the challenges were mostly related to classical geopolitical competition.1 Sovereign obligation, by contrast, is designed for a world in which sometime rivals are sometime partners and in which collective efforts are required to meet common challenges. Up to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter. When it comes to the domestic side, the argument is straightforward. In order to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order. I have written on what this entails in a book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home.2 This was sometimes interpreted as suggesting a turn away from foreign policy. It was nothing of the sort. Foreign policy begins at home, but it ends there only at the country’s peril.3 Earlier I mentioned that the United States has few unilateral options, that there are few if any things it can do better alone than with others. The counterpart to this claim is that the world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States. The United States is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is also true that the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities. An additional benefit is that respect for the United States and for the American political, social, and economic model (along with a desire to emulate it) will increase only if it is seen as successful. The most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth. U.S. growth levels may appear all right when compared with what a good many other countries are experiencing, but they are below what is needed and fall short of what is possible.

#### Slow growth is good---it causes peaceful accession to great power parity. Boosting growth causes a violent cling to power and transition conflicts.

Taliaferro et al. 18, Jeffrey Taliaferro: Professor of political science @ Tufts University. Steven Lobell: University of Utah. Norrin Ripsman: Lehigh University (Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective, *International Studies Review*, DOI: 10.1093/isr/viy023)

Conflict between hegemon and challenger can take many forms, ranging in intensity from a sustained rivalry for geopolitical influence in one or more geographic regions to a major or hegemonic war. Again, we narrowly defined peaceful change as a process in which the hegemon voluntarily cedes its dominant geopolitical role to a challenger in one or more geographic regions. This may entail the hegemon withdrawing its military forces and forward bases from a region, renegotiating, or modifying alliances and economic agreements with regional states, often at the behest of the challenger. It is important to note that peaceful change might occur in one locale, while conflict might occur simultaneously in another locale. Lastly, the likelihood of either of the two outcomes—conflict and peaceful transition— depends upon the grand strategic adjustments by the hegemon as well as the challenger.

Neoclassical Realist Theory of Peaceful Change

Our neoclassical realist theory purports to explain the conditions under which a regional or global hegemon will concede some or all of the challenger’s demands without contest. Like all neoclassical realist theories, our theory assumes that all states respond to the international constraints and opportunities they face but that how they respond will be shaped by their domestic constraints (Rose 1988; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016).

Our argument is that peaceful change is only likely in one of three circumstances: (1) when the hegemon’s foreign policy executive (FPE) has high confidence that change is inevitable because it lacks the military, political, or economic capabilities to resist it; or (2) when the political and economic costs of resisting that change are anticipated to be prohibitively high; or (3) when the FPE is domestically constrained in its ability to extract and mobilize the resources to resist the challenger. Each of these three propositions is a sufficient condition for the hegemon to accept peaceful change. They combine to make a necessary condition for peaceful change; that is, unless one or more of them is obtained, the hegemon will resist peaceful change. In this section, we unpack the logic underlying each of these propositions.

The dependent variable (DV) is the pattern of strategic adjustment by the hegemon. A hegemon has two broad strategic choices in response to a rising challenger: it can accept peaceful transition, or it can resist it.7 Resistance entails a variety of strategies, ranging from containment to preventive war. Economically, the hegemon might deny the challenger access to its markets, use sanctions, employ exchange and currency controls, and more broadly isolate the challenger from trade to undermine the economic base for its military power. Militarily, the hegemon could forge alliances with states along the challenger’s periphery, dramatically augment its own defense spending, sabotage the challenger’s weapons programs, seek to embroil the challenger’s armed forces in costly proxy conflicts, or, in the extreme, initiate a preventive war (Copeland 2000; Levy 2008, 2011).

A strategy of peaceful transition (or retrenchment) entails the strategic reorientation away from confrontation with a challenger. The hegemon, acknowledging the inevitability of the power transition, scales back its military deployments and alliance commitments, relaxes or removes economic sanctions targeting the challenger, and cedes its leadership role to the challenger in formerly contested regions (MacDonald and Parent 2011, 11–13).

The three propositions we derive from the theory specify the combinations of neoclassical realism’s systemic-level independent variables (IVs) and domestic-level intervening variables (IVVs) that increase the likelihood that a hegemon will pursue a resistance strategy or a peaceful transition strategy.

Proposition 1 (the inevitability of international change) relates directly to three IVs: the relative distribution of power, the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a particular region, and the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. Hegemons that enjoy an overall power advantage over rising challengers are unlikely to see a future power transition as inevitable. Hegemons experiencing relative decline or those that are simply at a marked disadvantage in one or more categories of power vis-à-vis a challenger, however, are more likely to conclude that a power transition is inevitable.

The second IV is the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a contested region. A state’s strategic environment refers to the magnitude and the imminence of the external threats and opportunities that it faces at any given time. All other things being equal, the more imminent and dangerous the threat or the more fleeting and enticing the opportunity, the more restrictive a state’s strategic environment will be. Conversely, the more remote and less intense the threat or the more enduring and less enticing the opportunity, the more permissive a state’s strategic environment will be. Restrictive and permissive strategic environments exist along a continuum (Ripsman et al. 2016, 52–53).

Regional hegemons exercise geopolitical dominance over a single region. A global hegemon, by definition, has wide interests across several regions of the globe. Consequently, they can confront different strategic environments across different regions. An increase or a decrease in a challenger’s economic, political, or military penetration of a contested region, up to and including the conquest of all or part of that region, can shift the strategic environment the hegemon faces from permissive to restrictive or vice versa (Taliaferro 2018). Where a global hegemon faces a restrictive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that the competitor will challenge its leadership in the locale and that a power transition is inevitable. Conversely, where it faces a permissive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that a power transition is not inevitable.

The third IV is the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. The degree of systemic clarity involves the signals or information that states receive from the international system or a regional sub-system. Systemic clarity has three subcomponents: (1) the extent to which external threats or opportunities can be readily identified, (2) whether the international system provides information about the time horizon in which those threats or opportunities will materialize, and (3) whether there is an “optimal” strategic response (Ripsman et al. 2016, 46–47).

The logic here is that if the hegemon judges that it has no alternatives to prevent a power transition, it would be irrational to waste resources resisting the inevitable. In general, hegemons have different strategic options for countering challengers in the short- and long-run. In the short-run, a hegemon can balance internally by increasing its armaments or externally by seeking allies. Over the longer turn, it has more options. Economic growth and emulation can redress relative decline. Nonetheless, if the hegemon’s leadership calculates that it lacks the resources for economic growth and emulation over the longer term, and they also calculate that the rising challenger’s economic growth will likely continue indefinitely, they might conclude resistance is futile. For instance, by 1901, recognizing the United States’ ascendency, Britain ceded leadership over the Western hemisphere by signing the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (Lobell 2003, 70–71). In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev realized that the depth of the Soviet Union’s relative economic decline made it impossible to continue competing with the United States. Gorbachev scaled back military commitments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and began to make unilateral concessions in nuclear and conventional arms control (Brooks and Wohlforth 2000, 33).

Proposition 2 (costs of resistance) relates to both internal and external factors, or neoclassical realism’s IVs and IVVs.8 In the first instance, the costs required to contain a challenger will depend on the external environment. The hegemon will need to assess the balance of power and what degree of military and economic resources the challenger can commit to the theater under threat. If these resources far exceed the aggregate resources available at the hegemon’s disposal or are in danger of “breaking the bank,” then the costs will be deemed too high.9 If these requirements do not exceed national power resources, the hegemon will next need to assess whether committing these resources to containing the challenger in the theater in question would undermine its ability to resist other challengers in other important regions. In the 1930s, for example, Britain faced challengers in multiple theaters: Germany threatened British interests in Western Europe, Italy threatened British interests in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and Japan threatened British interests in East and Southeast Asia (Kennedy 1987; Lobell 2003, 85–122; Ripsman and Levy 2008).